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i,
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Petitioners Marilyn Arons and Ruth Watson are non-
lawyers who assist parents at administrative hearings held
under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
("IDEA"). IDEA accords parents "the right to be accompanied
and advised" by counsel or "by individuals with special
knowledge or training with respect to children with
disabilities." 20 U.S.C. 1415(h)(1). The Supreme Court of
Delaware found that petitioners had engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law ("UPL") by providing such
assistance. The questions presented are:
1. Does IDEA's guarantee that parents may be
accompanied and advised by "individuals with special
knowledge or training with respect to children with disabilities"
entitle parents to have non-lawyer advocates appear on their
behalf at IDEA hearings, as the Department of Education, the
agency charged with administering IDEA, has consistently held
for twenty years?
2. Does IDEA impliedly preempt Delaware's UPL
rules where, as here, the Department of Education has
concluded that application of those rules to bar lay
representation in IDEA hearings would "unquestionably
subvert" the Act's core goal of empowering parents to
challenge adverse school board decisions?
ii
PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING AND
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
The petitioners in this case are Marilyn Arons, Ruth
Watson, and the Parent Information Center of New Jersey, Inc.,
a non-profit organization with which Ms. Arons and Ms.
Watson are affiliated. The respondent isthe Office of
Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of the State of
Delaware. The United States filed a briefamicus curiae in the
Delaware Supreme Court Supporting respondents and setting
forth the views of the United States Department of Education,
the agency charged with administering the Act. The one
corporation involved in the case, the Parents Information
Center of New Jersey, Inc., is a non-profit corporation with no
shareholders, no stock, and no parent or subsidiary
corporations.
iii
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1PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Marilyn Arons, Ruth Watson and the Parents
Information Center of New Jersey, Inc. ("Petitioners"),
respectfully petition for a writ of certiorari to review the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Delaware in this case.
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the Supreme Court of Delaware is
reported at 756 A.2d 867 (Del. 2000) and is set forth in the
Appendix ("App.") at 1A-15A. The Findings and
Recommended Disposition of the Board on the Unauthorized
Practice of Law of the Delaware Supreme Court is unreported
and is set forth at App. 16A-42A.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Delaware was
entered on July 6, 2000. This Court has jurisdiction under-28
U.S.C. 1257(a).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
INVOLVED
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides, in relevant part, that: "No State shall..
• deprive any Person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const., Amend. XIV.
The pertinent provision of the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1415 ("IDEA"), provides:
2Procedural safeguards ***
(h) Safeguards. Any party to a hearing conducted pursuant to
subsection (f) or (k), or an appeal conducted pursuant to
subsection (g), shall be accorded--
(1) the right to be accompanied and advised by counsel
and by individuals with special knowledge or training with
respect to the problems of children with disabilities;
(2) the right to present evidence and confront,
cross-examine, and compel the attendance of witnesses;
(3) the right to a written, or, at the option of the parents,
electronic verbatim record of such hearing; and
(4) the right to written, or, at the option of the parents,
electronic findings of fact and decisions * * *
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
• The unauthorized practice of law ("UPL") proceedings
giving rise to this Petition were an outgrowth of five IDEA
hearings conducted by the Delaware Department of Public
Instruction in which Ms. Arons and Ms. Watson appeared on
behalf of parents. Ms. Arons and Ms. Watson are, respectively,
the founder and the Executive Director of the Parents
Information Center of New Jersey, Inc., a non-profit
organization established in 1977 to provide advice, counseling
and advocacy services to families of children with disabilities.
Because the hearings that Ms. Arons and Ms. Watson handled
were held pursuant to IDEA, and because Petitioners' argument
is based in large measure on the preemptive reach of IDEA, we
start with an overview of IDEA's structure and purpose. We
then recount the proceedings before the Board on Unauthorized
Practice of Law and the Delaware Supreme Court.
3A. IDEA.
IDEA was enacted in response to Congress'
longstanding concern that "more than half of the children with
disabilities in the United States do not receive appropriate
services." 20 U.S.C. 1400(b)(3); see also Honig v. Doe, 484
U.S. 305, 309-12 (1984); Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ.
v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179 (1982). Congress' goal in IDEA
was to "assure that all children with disabilities have available
to them.., a free appropriate public education" and to protect
the rights of children with disabilities and their parents or
guardians. 20 U.S.C. 1400(c). Accordingly, Congress devised
a system of funding for special education and evaluative
procedures, 20 U.S.C. 1411, and required States and localities
that accept such funding to implement a plan for providing
special education, identifying children who need special
educational assistance, and determining what assistance each
child needs. 20 U.S.C. 1412-1414. Delaware participates in
and receives federal funds under IDEA. App. A44 (¶5).
At IDEA's heart are the procedural safeguards that
States and localities are required to accord "children with
disabilities and their parents" to assure "the provision of a free
and public education." 20 U.S.C. 1415(a). To determine the
unique needs of each disabled child, IDEA requires the
preparation of an "individualized educational plan" ("IEP") that
sets performance goals for the child and objective criteria and
evaluation procedures for determining whether the child is
progressing at a proper rate_ 20 U.S.C. 1414. Written prior
notice to parents is required whenever a school either "proposes
to initiate or change" or "refuses to initiate or change" the
"identification, evaluation, placement , or provision of special
educational services for the child." 20 U.S.C. 1415(b)(3). This
notice must be fully informative, and parents must have an
opportunity to present complaints about the IEP. 20 U.S.C.
41415(b)(3)-(7). When complaints are forthcoming, "the parents
shall have an opportunity for an impartial due process hearing,"
which is typically provided by the local educational unit, 20
U.S.C. 1415(0, and for an impartial review on appeal to a State
educational agency. 20 U.S.C. 1415(g).
At due process hearings held under IDEA, any party
"shall be accorded" the "right to be accompanied and advised
by counsel and by individuals with special knowledge or
training with respect to the problems of children with
disabilities." 20 U.S.C. 1415(h)(1). At least since 1981, the
Department of Education has consistently taken the position.
that this provision authorizes non-lawyer representation at
IDEA hearings, and indeed has threatened to initiate
proceedings to withdraw federal funding from states that fail to
permit non-lawyer representation. •Brief for the United States,
In re Arons, No. 440, Del. Sup. Ct. (Dec. 1, 1999) at 33-34
(hereinafter "U.S. Amicus Br.").
• In Delaware, due process hearings are conducted by the
Department of Public Instruction. App. A45-A46 (¶8). These
are formal, adversarial, adjudicatory hearings held before a
three-member panel appointed by the Department of Public
Instruction. Id. Parents play no role in the selection of panel
members. Id. The panels consist of an attorney (who is always
the chair), an educator (generally a professor of special
education or a related field at a Delaware college or university),
and a lay person, ld. The parties consist of parents, who are
not generally represented by lawyers; the local school board,
which is always represented by counsel; and the Department of
Public Instruction, which generally is also represented by
counsel. Id. (¶11). Because due process hearings involve
complex factual questions relating to the unique learning needs
of the disabled child, the hearings often last several days. Id.
The hearings begin with opening statements from each party.
5Id. at A47 (¶13). Evidence is then presented through the
testimony of witnesses, who are subject to direct and cross-
examination, ld. Although the rules of evidence do not strictly
apply, the Chair rules on legal issues, the qualifications of
experts, and objections to relevance, materiality, and
admissibility. Id. (¶¶12-13). Following the presentation of
evidence, the parties make closing statements and then submit
post-hearing briefs and memoranda. Id.l
B. Proceedings Before The Board On The
Unauthorized Practice Of Law.
On August 8, 1996, respondent Office of Disciplinary
Counsel ("ODC"), an arm of the Delaware Supreme Court,
filed a charge with the Board on the Unauthorized Practice of
Law of the Supreme Court of Delaware ("Board") alleging that
petitioners had violated Delaware's UPL rules by representing
families of children with disabilities in five IDEA hearings.
Ms. Arons and Ms. Watson acknowledged that they had, in
fact, represented these parents, but denied that their activities
constituted the unauthorized practice of law because IDEA
explicitly authorizes representation by non-lawyer experts.
Petitioners pointed out as well that every other state permits lay
representation of parents in IDEA proceedings and that the
United States Department of Education, the agency charged
with administering IDEA, has long held the position that the
Act authorizes non-lawyer advocacy. Because the pivotal issue
was a legal one -- namely, whether IDEA authorizes non-
lawyer representation -- the parties agreed that they would
i Parents who do not prevail in the administrative
process have the right to seek judicial review. 20 U.S.C.
1415(i)(2). Ms. Arons and Ms. Watson do not claim a right to
represent parents in court proceedings.
6submit a Stipulation of Facts to the Board in lieu of a formal
hearing. App. A43 (Stipulation); A54 (Amendments to
Stipulation).
The Stipulation establishes a number of facts relevant
to this Petition. To begin with, the charges brought against
Ms. Arons and Ms. Watson were not made by dissatisfied
clients who were duped by imposters masquerading as lawyers.
Rather, the charges were initiated by the school boards -- the
parents' opponents in these hearings. App. A43-A44 (¶2).
The parents sought out Ms. Arons' and Ms. Watson's
assistance, this assistance was provided free-of-charge, the
parents were advised at the outset that they were not lawyers,
and the parents "believe that their position was effectively
presented in the due process hearings." Id. at A51 (¶¶29-32).
Each of the parents had sought to obtain counsel but had been
unable to find any lawyer to assist them on a fee-for-service,
reduced cost, orpro bono basis. Id. at A50 (¶21). Nor is
there any dispute that, but for Ms. Arons' and Ms. Watson's
assistance, the parents would have foregone their statutory right
to contest decisions by the school board. Id. at A50-A51 (¶27-
28). As the parties stipulated, the parents would have done so,
not because their claims lacked merit, but because (1) they
"were imimidated by the formality and complexity of due
process hearings," (2) they did not have "grounding in the
technical issues that lay at the core of their disputes with the
local school boards to enable them to handle the hearings pro
se," and (3) the hearings "placed them in an adversary posture
against two instrumentalities of government, each represented
by lawyers." Id.
Finally, there is no question that non-lawyers like Ms.
Arons and Ms. Watson are competent to advocate effectively
on behalf0f families with disabled children. To be effective,
an advocate at an IDEA hearing must be familiar with the
7clinical aspects of the child's condition (skills that lawyers
ordinarily lack), as well as the rules governing the conduct of
the hearing, ld. at A47-A48 (¶14). Non-lawyers with "special
knowledge and training with respect to the problems of children
with disabilities" are fully capable of presenting the parents'
case to the panel. Indeed, Ms. Arons and Ms. Watson obtained
significant relief in each of the five cases at issue here, even
though they were matched against members of the Delaware
Bar. ld. at A52 (¶33); see also id. at A56 (¶6)
After reviewing the stipulated record and detailed
briefs, and hearing argument from counsel, the Board issued its
Findings and Recommended Disposition. In re Arons, No.
UPL-4, 1996 (App. 16). The Board began by rejecting
Petitioners' argument that IDEA entitles lay advocates to
represent parents in IDEA proceedings. The Board reasoned
that the statutory "accompany and advise" language falls short
of an authorization to non-lawyers to actually "represent"
parents in due process hearings, ld. at A27-A29. In so ruling,
the Board refused to defer to a 1981 opinion letter issued by the
Department of Education because it disagreed with the
Department's legal analysis. Id. at A31-A36. In light of its
reading of the Act, the Board rejected Petitioners' preemption
analysis, concluding that IDEA did not "override Delaware's
regulatory authority" over the unauthorized practice of law. Id.
at A36. The Board left unaddressed Petitioners' contention that
enforcing Delaware's UPL rules to bar non-lawyer advocacy
would frustrate IDEA's goal of enabling parents to challenge
school board decisions that were adverse to their children. The
Board recommended that the Delaware Supreme Court direct
8Ms. Arons and Ms. Watson to cease "the unauthorized practice
of law in the State of Delaware." Id. at A42. 2
C. Proceedings Before The Delaware Supreme
Court.
After Petitioners filed their appeal to the Delaware
Supreme Court, the United States sought, and was granted,
leave to appear as an amicus curiae. Its brief explained that its
"[p]articipation in this case is particularly important since it
involves a fundamental issue relating to the purpose of the Act,
as well as the procedural protections the Act guarantees parents
of children with disabilities. The assistance of informed lay
persons for parents without counsel is critical to parents' ability
to protect fully their children's right to an education guaranteed
by iDEA." U.S. Amicus Br. at 1-2.
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed. Petitioners'
main argument, joined by the United States, was that IDEA
entitles non-lawyers "with specia ! knowledge or training" to
advocate on behalf of parents because: (l) section 1415(h)(1)
uses the same language to authorize lay experts as to authorize
attorneys to act on behalf of parties at due process hearings; and
(2) forbidding lay representation at IDEA hearings would lead
to an absurd result -- namely that parents, who have the right
to question witnesses and present evidence at hearings, would
simply serve as conduits for the expert's questions and
evidence, leading to a time-consuming and cumbersome
charade. Petitioners and the United States also emphasized
that, if there were any questions about the clarity of the Act, the
2 All of Petitioners' federal statutory and constitutional
arguments were timely raised before the Board and were
properly preserved before the Delaware Supreme Court.
9court should defer to the consistently-held position of the
Department of Education that the Act authorizes non-lawyer
representation. And finally, Petitioners urged that permitting
Delaware to invoke its UPL rules in the context of IDEA due
process hearings would threaten the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees of due process and equal protection, a threat which
the Act should be construed to avoid.
The court rejected these arguments. I_aitially, it found
IDEA's language "ambiguous to the extent it appears to confer
joint authority on lawyers and non-lawyers to accompany and
advise parents." App. at A6. Resolving this ambiguity in
ODC's favor, the court relied mainly on Arons v. New Jersey
State Bd. of Educ., 842 F.2d 48 (3d Cir. 1988), which held that
non-lawyer advocates may not seek attorney's fees under IDEA
and, in dicta, suggested that IDEA does not authorize non-
lawyer representation in due process hearings. Id. at A6-A8.
The court also reasoned that a passage in the IDEA's legislative
history lent strength tothe conclusion that IDEA's drafters
envisioned different roles for lawyers and non-lawyer experts
in IDEA hearings, with lawyers serving traditional
representational functions and experts rendering advice. Id.
And the court refused to defer to the Department of Education's
reading of the Act, both because it was set out in an opinion
letter, not a regulation, and because it found the Department's
analysis unpersuasive, ld. at A9-AIO.
The court next rejected Petitioners' argument that the
Act should be read to permit lay representation in IDEA
hearings to avoid running afoul of the due process and equal
protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at
A1 I-A14. The court agreed that the interests at stake were
"substantial," and that its ruling would result in some parents
forfeiting "their statutory right to contest changes to their
child's education plan because they carmot afford legal counsel
10
and will opt not to proceedpro se due to the complexity of the
heafings and the prospect of facing two sets of government
lawyers." ld. at A 13. Nonetheless, the court concluded that
Delaware's interest in the regulation of the practice of law
"significantly outweighs any potential benefit that some
individual parents and children may obtain through the services
of lay advocates." ld.
•Petitioners' final line of argument, also supported by the
United States, was that the doctrine of implied preemption
prohibited the application of Delawarers UPL rules to bar non-
lawyer experts from representing parents in IDEA due process
hearings. Based on its expertise in the administration of the
Act, the United States argued that enforcement of Delaware's
UPL rules would thwart the fulfillment of the important federal
objectives embodied in IDEA, and thus State law had to yield.
The Delaware Supreme Court did not address this argument.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
Review by this Court is warranted because the decision
below egregiously misreads a pivotal provision of IDEA --the
provision that safeguards the right of parents to contest adverse
school board decisions. IDEA is an important federal statute on
which tens of thousands of parents depend to ensure that their
disabled children receive an appropriate education, and the
provision at issue here is integral to IDEA's effective operation.
That is not only Petitioners' view; it is the position of the
United States Department of Education.
Nonetheless, according to the court below, nothing in
• IDEA limits the ability of any state to enforce its UPL rules in
a manner that forces parents either to handle IDEA due process
hearings pro se or to forfeit their fights to a hearing altogether.
That reading (1) conflicts with IDEA's plain language, which
11
says that parents may be accompanied both by lawyers and by
non-lawyer experts and makes no distinction between the
functions lawyers and non-lawyers experts may perform; (2)
disregards the Department of Education's judgment that IDEA
authorizes lay representation; and (3) raises intractable due
process and equal protection problems because it allows a state
-- which has a substantial financial stake in the outcome of
IDEA due process hearings -- to stack the deck decisively in
its favor.
Compounding its error, the court below turned a deaf
ear to the argument that depriving parents of non-lawyer
representation subverts IDEA's core goal of empowering
parents to challenge school decisions denying-their child an
educational opportunity. Without an advocate to take on their
cause, parents will abandon their statutory right to contest
adverse decisions by school authorities. Who Can blame them?
In Delaware, due process hearings are complex, formal, and
highly adversarial, and parents of modest means and limited
education cannot be expected to willingly take on two sets of
government-paid lawyers. Despite this Court's admonition in
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 496 (1996) that the
agency responsible for implementing a statute "is uniquely
qualified to determine whether a particular form of state law"
frustrates federal objectives, the court below failed to heed the
Department's warning and left the issue unaddressed. Because
the ruling below frustrates a core goal of IDEA, review by this
Court is warranted.
A. IDEA Guarantees Parents The Right To Have
Non-Lawyers Advocate On Their Behalf In Due
Process Hearings. '
1. At the heart of IDEA are the procedural safeguards
that enable parents to participate in the development of an
12
educational program appropriate to the needs of their disabled
children. See 20 U.S.C. 1415(h). Pivotal among these
safeguards is the right to file a "complaint" and have an
"impartial due process hearing" if parents are dissatisfied with
"any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or
educational placement of the[it] child, or the provision of a free
appropriate education" for their child. See Board ofEduc, v.
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 182-83, 204-205 (1982); 20 U.S.C.
1415(b)(6) and (if).
The key to this case is the meaning of subsection
1415(h)(1), and "the starting point for interpreting a statute is
the language of the statute itself." Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm 'nv. GTE, Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980). The
language of IDEA could hardly be clearer. Section 1415(h)(1)
gives parties the "right to be accompanied and advised" not
only by counsel but also "by individuals with special
knowledge and training." The Act draws no distinction
between the two, treating lawyers and specialized lay advocates
exactly the same. The next provision of the Act, subsection
1415(h)(2), says that parties have "the right to present evidence
and confront, cross examine, and compel the attendance of
witnesses." These rights are conferred on parties, not their
counsel or representatives, which underscores that the Act
makes no distinction between lawyers and lay representatives
or limits the activities of the latter. Lawyers may take on the
duties authorized by section 1415(h)(2) because their clients are
"accompanied and advised" by them under section 1415(h)(l).
Because that is the case, then, bY dint of the same operative
language, lay advocates who possess special knowledge and
training may undertake the same duties. No other plausible
conclusion can be drawn from this provision.
2. Petitioners' reading of IDEA is confirmed by the
Department of Education. Twenty years ago, after 1415(h)(1 )
13
was added by the 1975 amendments to the Act, the State of
Washington asked for a "legal analysis regarding the role of lay
advocates in educational agency administrative hearings"
conducted under IDEA. Letter of Theodore Sky, Acting
General Counsel, Department of Education, to the Honorable
Frank B. Brouillet, State of Washington,at 1 (April 8, 1981).
The State maintained that the Act's language suggested that
non-lawyers were not in fact authorized to engage in activities
that are conventionally thought of as legal representation, such
as examining and cross-examining witnesses. The Acting
General Counsel of the Department of Education rejected this
reading of the Act in a detailed opinion letter, concluding that
"lay advocates are permitted to represent parties at [IDEAl
administrative hearings and appeals." Id. at 4.3
The Department of Education has consistently
interpreted the Act to permit non-lawyer representation. See,
e.g., Request ofEig, EHLR [1987 Transfer Binder] 211:270,
Stipp. 57 (CCR); Virginia Department of Education, EHLR
[1987 Transfer Binder] 257:349, Supp. 84 (CCR). The
Department's position is also reflected in its IDEA regulations,
which require public agencies, when giving notice to parents of
due process hearings, to inform parents "of any free or low-cost
legal and other relevant services available in the area." 34
C.F.R, 300.506(c) (emphasis added), The Department's
interpretation also accords with that of the academic
community. E.g., Rapp, EDUCATtOIqLAW,§ 4-I0.03120][iv] at
10-568-69 (Matthew Bender & Co. 1998); Note, Enforcing the
Right to "Appropriate Education": The Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1103,
1111-12 n.56 (1979). And the Department's construction is
consistent with the case law on this issue. Z.A.v. San Bruno
Park Sch. Dist., 165 F.3d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1999)
(recognizing that lawyer not admitted to California bar "could
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The Department gave three reasons for its conclusion.
First, it noted that it is "clear from the statutory language alone
that Congress contemplated that lay advocates, as well as
attorneys, be permitted to play a role at such hearings; and did
not distinguish between lawyers and lay advocates in defining
that role." ld. Second, the legislative history of section
1415(h)(1) fortified the conclusion that Congress sought to
authorize lay representation. Finally, at the time section
1415(h)(1 ) was enacted, Congress had routinely authorized the
use of lay advocates in administrative proceedings under
federal law, even when the hearings were conducted by State or
local authorities pursuant to programs as diverse as social
security, veterans' benefits, and food stamps. Id. at 6. Because
the use of lay advocates had become "commonplace," the
Department concluded that there was "no reason to believe that
Congress intended to restrict representation at [IDEA] hearings
and appeals to attorneys, rather than allowing for the widest
• possible advocacy," especially since there is "no requirement
that the hearing officers conducting such proceedings be
attorneys." Id. at 8 & n.6. As a result of the Department's
ruling in this regard, for twenty years every state in the nation
permitted non-lawyer representation in IDEA due process
hearings. '
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court of Delaware rejected
the Department's reading of IDEA, concluding that the Act was
ambiguous and that it owed only "modest" deference to the
appear as a lay advocate" at IDEA hearing but could not
recover attorney's fees); Woods v. New Jersey Dep 'tof Educe,
858 F. Supp. 51, 55 (D.N.J. 1993) (attorney-client priyilege
attaches to communications between lay advocate and parent
during IDEA hearings because "substance of [the] relationship
is one of an attorney and client").
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Department 0fEducation. App. at AI 1. The court was wrong
on both counts.
a. As to the court's conclusion that IDEA is
ambiguous, nowhere does the court offer a plausible alternative
interpretation of section 1415(h)(1). ODC had contended that
the Act should be read to permit lawyers only to provide
representation in due process hearings, because of their inherent
and presumptive representational authority. But that reading of
the Act renders most of section 1415(h)(1) surplusage and
places the Delaware Supreme Court's reading of section
1415(h)(1) in tension with the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Z.A.v.
San Bruno Park Sch. Dist., 165 F.3d 1273, 1276 (1999), which
recognized that a lawyer not admitted to Califomia "could
appear as a lay advocate" at an IDEA heating but could not
recover attorneys' fees.
The court's reading of the Act also leads to an absurd
result. The Act indisputably confers on parents the right to
advocate on behalf of their children at due process hearings,
regardless of legal training, because they are "parties." E.g.,
Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of Educ., 161 F.3d 225,232 (3d Cir.
1998). The Act also accords special status to individuals with
expertise in the needs of disabled children and gives parents the
right to be accompanied and advised by such individuals. It
would be "illogical" and "absurd" to "presume that Congress
would deny that [representational] function to the persons 'with
special knowledge or training' that Congress designated to
assist these parents." U.S. Amicus Br. at 20. It would be
equally illogical for Congress to have thought that a statute was
required to permit a parent to bring to a due process heating an
expert whose 0nly function was to quietly advise the parent.
Indeed, the Delaware Supreme Court's construction leads to the
conclusion that non-lawyer experts may tell parents what
questions to ask, what arguments to make, what evidence to
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introduce, and otherwise orchestrate the parents' case, so long
as they remain silent and act only through the parent. Nowhere
does the court explain why Congress would have ordained such
a cumbersome and bizarre process. Because the court's
construction of/he Act collides with the canon that statutes be
read to avoid "odd" or "absurd" results, Public Citizen v.
Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454 (1989); Green v.
Brock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 509 (1989), it
warrants review by this Court.
b. Equally troubling is the Delaware court's i'efusal to
give anything but "modest" deference to the Department of
Education's interpretation of the Act. The court first justifies
its decision by labeling the Department's action "informal" and
deprecating the Department's regulatory responsibilities under
the Act. App. at Al i-Al2. But these suggestions are wrong,
and overlook the Department's special role in IDEA's drafting
and fine-tuning, see, e.g., Honig, 484 U.S. at 311-12; the
Department's day-to-day responsibility for IDEA's
implementation and enforcement, see, e.g., id.. at 31 l; Cedar
Rapids Comm. Sch. Dist. v. Garrett F., 119 S. Ct. 992, 998
(1999); and the Department's considered judgment that non-
lawyer representation is crucial for the fair and effective
administration of the Act. The Act in fact contemplates a
central administrative role for the Department, authorizing it
to issue "rules and regulations," 20 U.S.C. 1402(a), administer
"programs and activities" to implement the Act's mandates, id.
1417(b), and supervise the states' compliance with various
IDEA requirements, ld. 1411-1413, 1420; Honig, 484 U.S. at
310. For these reasons, this Court has always looked to the
Department for guidance in cases challenging the adequacy of
a state's, or a local school board's, compliance with IDEA.
See, e.g., Garren F., 119 S. Ct. at 997-98 n.6; Irving Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883,891-92 & n.9 (1984).
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The court's suggestion that the principles of deference
this Court has developed in eases like Chevron, USA v. NRDC,
467 U.S. 837 (1984), and Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala,
512 U.S. 504, 512-13 (1994), do not fully apply because the
Department's views were set forth in an opinion letter and an
amicus curiae brief, instead of a regulation, is also off base.
This Court has said time and again that courts must enforce an
agency's consistently-held construction of a statute it
administers unless it is demonstrably unreasonable, even where
the agency's interpretation is set forth in informal statements
like opinion letters, guidance documents, and even amicus
briefs. See, e.g., National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v.
Department of Interior, 526 U.S. 86, 99-100 (1999); Auer v.
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462-63 (1997); Gardebring v. Jenkins,
485 U.S. 415, 429-30 (1988). The Department's
comprehensive and consistent statements -- in a detailed,
nine-page opinion letter, a number of administrative orders, and
a thirty-five page amicus brief-- easily satisfy this Court's
reasonableness test.
Finally, the court refused to defer to the Department of
Education's interpretation of IDEA because it disagreed with
the Department's legal analysis. But the Department has the far
better of the argument, and the two reasons cited by the court
do not justify its conclusion.
First, the court's heavy reliance on Arons v. New Jersey
State Bd. ofEduc., 842 F.2d 58 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
942 (1988)_ is misguided. The only issue presented in Arons
was whether a lay advocate, whose authority to represent
parents in IDEA proceedings was unchallenged, was entitled to
seek attorney's fees for her services. The Third Circuit said no.
The Third Circuit's dicta suggesting that non-lawyers could
not represent parents in IDEA hearings is just that -- dicta.
Had the representation issue been before the court, it would
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have been briefed by the parties (it was not), the Department of
Education's views would have been presented to the court (they
were not), and, consistent with Third Circuit precedent, tile
court would have accorded substantial deference to the
Department's reading of the Act. See, e.g., Connecticut Gen.
Life Ins. v. Commissioner, 177 F.3d 136, 144 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 120 S. Ct. 496 (1999); Elizabeth BlackwellHealth Ctr.
for Women v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 170, 183 & n.9 (3d Cir. 1995).
But the question of deference did not arise.
Second, the court cited one sentence from the Senate
Conference Report that said that in IDEA hearings a party is
entitled to "the right to counsel and to be advised and
accompanied by individuals" expert in the problems of
handicapped individuals. App. at A8. Based on this statement,
the court concluded that "Congress envisioned [a clear
distinction] between the representational role of lawyers and
the advisory role of non-lawyers." Id. This ambiguous snippet
from the Committee report does not support the court's
conclusion. Not only has this Court repeatedly cautioned
against the use of committee reports in interpreting statutory
language, see, e.g., National Fed "n.of Federal Employees, 526
U.S. at 96; Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471,483-
84 (1997), but also reliance on a committee report is especially
inappropriate where, as here, there are strong contradictory
signals from other legislative materials. Wisconsin Pub.
lntervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 609-11 (1991). The
crucial "accompany and advise" language in section 1415(h)
was written by Representative Miller, who explained the
language by reference to then-existing California hearing
requirements, which allowed lay experts to advocate on behalf
of parents. U.S. Amicus Br. at 32. This history, which speaks
directly to the question of lay representation, is far more
persuasiv e than the lone sentence in the Senate Conference
Report. But even accepting the court's overstated
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characterization of the Report, Wisconsin Public Intervenor
makes plain that reliance on it here was wholly inappropriate. 4
The court's cramped and illogical reading of the Act is
a textbook example of why courts -- including state courts --
should defer to expert agencies rather than setting sail on their
own interpretative voyage. As the Department's amicus brief
emphasized, interpreting subsection 1415(h)(1) to permit lay
representation serves IDEA's overarching goal of giving
parents a say in the educational opportunities available to their
disabled child. On the other hand, the court's interpretation of
section 1415(h)(1) deals a body blow to the fair and effective
enforcement of !DEA by placing due process hearings out of
the reach of most parents. U.S. Amicus Br. at 20, 26. The
court was wrong to substitute its reading of the Act for that of
4 In any event, fairly read, the Senate Reports support
Petitioners. The Senate Committee Report simply tracks the
statutory language; the Conference Report on which the court
relied confirms (1) that hearings rights conferredin section
1415(h) run to parties, not to counsel; (2) that IDEA due
process hearings were intended to be informal, with hearings
overseen by "impartial" hearing officers who do not have to be
lawyers or have any legal training (in Delaware two of three
panel members are not lawyers); and (3) that Congress
recognized that informality was important because parents
could not be expected to have the resources to retain counsel,
much less hire counsel andexpert advisors. S. Conf. Rep. No.
455, 94th Cong., 1't Sess. 47-51 (1975) reprinted in [1975]
USCCAN 1425, 1500-03. None of these observations is
consistent with the court's claim that Congress drew a
distinction between the functions iawyers and non-lawyer
experts may perform in IDEA hearings.
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the expert agency, and this Court should grant review and
correct the Delaware court's egregious misreading of the Act.
3. The Delaware Supreme Court also erred in brushing
aside the serious due process concerns created by its
construction of IDEA -- concerns that argue in favor of
interpreting the Act to permit non-lawyer representatio n.
Petitioners' due process argument was based on the balancing
test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Petitioners maintained that the interest at stake -- a child's
_ndamental right to an education -- is substantial, that the
protection of lay representation could be provided m parents
without cost to the state, and that, without a capable advocate
at IDEA hearings, children run an exceptional risk that they
will be denied educational opportunities to which they are
legally entitled.
The risk of deprivation is particularly high in IDEA
cases because school boards have strong financial incentives to
deny costly services to disabled children. E.g., Garrett F., 119
S. Ct. at 999-1000; Tatro, 468 U.S. at 892. Because of the
stakes, the school board and the state are represented by
counsel and can commit resources to the hearing that inevitably
dwarf those available to parents. Cf. Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745, 763 (1982). By denying parents the right to non-
lawyer assistance, the ruling below magnifies the disparities
between the parties to the point where parents have no
reasonable chance of prevailing -- no matter how meritorious
their claim. No one seriously disputes that a contest between
the State and school board, both represented by counsel, on one
side, and a pro se parent on the other, would be lopsided or, as
this Court put it in Lassiter v. Deparment of Social Servs. of
Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981), "unwholesomely
unequal." Consequently, parents who cannot find or afford a
lawyer, and are denied lay assistance, will either give up (as the
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parents here would have done) or be hopelessly overmatched
at the hearing. The guarantees of the Due Process Clause do
not permit a state to stack the deck so decisively in its favor.
SeeLittle v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1981). To avoid this
entanglement, Petitioners urged that the court apply the settled
rule of construction that favors avoidance of constitutional
problems. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. &
Const. Trade Council, 458 U.S. 568, 575 (1988).
The Delaware Supreme Court rejected this argument,
concluding that the state's interest in regulating the practice of
law trumped the interests of families with disabled children in
having non-lawyer representation. The court's principal
concem was the threat to the public posed by incompetent and
unaccountable lay advocates. But this concern is overstated in
the IDEA context. The plain text of IDEA sets forth an
exacting standard for representation: To represent parents in
IDEA proceedings, non-lawyers must demonstrate "special
knowledge or training with respect to the problems of
disabilities." App. at A47-48 (¶14); id. at A55 (¶3); Note,
Right to "'AppropriateEducation:" The Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1976, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1103,
1152 n.56 (1979). And Delaware may hold lay advocates as
accountable as lawyers by conditioning the participation of
non-lawyer advocates on their willingness to comply with the
Rules of Professional Conduct that bind Delaware lawyers. See
Woods v. New Jersey Dep "tof Educ., 858 F. Supp. 51 (D.N.J.
1993).
As its final reason, the court expressed skepticism that
there was, iri fact, a serious and unmet need for lay assistance
in Delaware IDEA hearings. In so doing, however, the court
reconfigured, or simply disregarded, the evidence. The
Stipulation entered into by the parties categorically states that
none of the parents involved could find lawyers willing to
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handle these cases on any basis: fee-for-service, reduced cost,
or pro bono. App. at 50 (¶21). The only non-profit
organization in Delaware that provides assistance to parents in
IDEA cases, the Delaware Community Legal Aid Society,
renders service only "on occasion," only when the Society's
case-load permits the acceptance of new cases, and only when
the case satisfies "the organization's case acceptance criteria."
Id. at A55 (¶4). None of these parents met those criteria or
asked for help at the right time, and we daresay that the same
fate awaits the vast majority of parents in Delaware. 5
The ruling of the Delaware Supreme Court jeopardizes
the due process and equal protection rights of families with
disabled children in Delaware -- and elsewhere, should other
jurisdictions follow Delaware's lead -- by forcing them to
make the Hobson's choice of handling a heating pro se or
forfeiting their tight to a due process heating. Because of the
serious constitutional implications of the ruling below, review
by this Court is warranted.
5 Perhaps as an olive branch, the court holds out the
prospect of conducting a rulemaking to authorize non-lawyers
to represent parents in IDEA proceedings. App. at A15. At the
time of the submission of this Petition, n ° such proceeding has
been commenced. Even were a rulemaking to take place, the
right of parents to have lay advocates in IDEA hearings ought
not depend on the whim of any particular state or the vagaries
of state law.
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B. The Ruling Below Is At Odd With Settled
Implied Preemption Principles.
This Court has repeatedly held that state law must yield
where it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co._ 120 S. Ct. 1913, 1921
(2000) (citations omitted); WisconsinPub. Intervenor, 501 U.S.
at 605 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
This principle compels reversal of the decision below because
the court's ruling thwarts perhaps the most basic fight accorded
to parents under IDEA -- the fight to challenge through due
process hearings adverse determinations affecting their child's
educational opportunities. School Comm. of Burlington v.
Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985); Honig, 484 U.S. at
311,321; Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S.992, 1011 (1984).
This is not only Petitioners' view, it is the view of the
Department of Education. In the brief filed on behalf of the
Department below, the United States argued that "barring
advocacy by a person 'with special knowledge or training'
substantially frustrates a parent's statutory right to have
meaningful input at a due process hearing." UiS. Amicus Br.
at 26. The United States went on to conclude that "[b]ecause
IDEA was intended to ensure the full parftcipaf_on of parents in
all educational decisions involving their children, see Honig,
484 U.S. at 311,324, and the Board's [now court's] ruling
unquestionably subverts a parent's right to challenge such a
decision during the mandato_ due process hearing, it cannot
stand." Id. at 27 (emphasis added). 6
6 Should the Court harbor any doubts about the
Department's position in this case, we urge that the Court
solicit the Department's views before acting on this Petition.
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Under this Court's rulings, the courts below were
obligated to at least give weight to, if not heed, the
Department's warning that barring lay representation would
impermissibly obstruct the accomplishment of IDEA's purpose.
For example, in Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 496, this Court
emphasized that, because federal agencies that administer the
law are "uniquely qualified to determine whether a particular
form of state law" frustrates federal objectives, their views on
implied preemption are entitled to considerable weight. Just
last Term, the Court reaffirmed that principle in Geier, where
the Court, in evaluating an implied preemption claim, placed
considerable reliance on the views of the Department of
Transportation, noting that "the agency's own views should
make a difference." 120 S. Ct. at 1926. To borrow from the
Court's reasoning in Geier, under the IDEA "Congress has
delegated to the... [Department of Education] authority to
implement the statute; the subject matter is technical; and the
relevant history and background are complex and extensive.
The agency is likely to have a thorough understanding of its
own regulation and its objectives and is 'uniquely qualified' to
comprehend the likely impact of state requirements. Medtronic,
518 U.S. at 496; see id. at 506 (Breyer, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment)." 120 S. Ct. at 1926-27.
Review in this case is warranted because the court
below not only failed to take the Department's views into
account, it appeared to disregard them altogether. The result is
that the fulfillment of an important provision of federal law has
been thwarted bythe application of inconsistent state law,
despite the legion of this Court's cases holding that, under these
circumstances, state law, not federal law, must yield.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Petition should be
granted.
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WALSH, Justice:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Board on the
Unauthorized Practice of Law (the "Board"), an arm of the
Supreme Court of Delaware, concluding that the appellants had
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. The appellants,
supported by the United States Department 0f Justice as amicus
curiae, contend that the Board erred in not recognizing their
entitlement under federal law to represent parents of children
with disabilities before State administrative agencies. That
entitlement, it is argued, preempts state law and is supported by
due process considerations. We conclude, however, that the
Board's decision is supported by the evidence and free of any
error of law. Accordingly, we affirm.
I
The appellants, Marilyn Arons and Ruth Watson, are,
respectively, the founder and Executive Director of Parent
Information Center of New Jersey, Inc. (collectively
"Appellants"). The Parent Information Center is a non-profit
organization founded in 1977 that provides advice, counseling
and advocacy services to families of children with disabilities.
On five occasions, the Center has represented families of
children with disabilities in "due process" hearings held by the
Delaware Department of Public Instruction pursuant to the
federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"),
20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. t Four of these five hearings were
_Because Delaware participates in and receives federal
funds under the IDEA, proceedings governing the special
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handled by Arons, while the other heating was handled by
Watson. Although neither Arons nor Watson is an attorney,
both possess special knowledge and training with respect to the
problems of children with disabilities.
The IDEA is intended to "ensure that children with
disabilities and their parents are guaranteed procedural
safeguards with respect to the provision of free appropriate
public education." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a). Under the IDEA, the
parents of a disabled child are entitled to challenge any
proposal to change or initiate, or refusal to change or initiate,
the identification, evaluation, educational placement or any
other aspect of the provision of a free appropriate [*4] public
education service to that child. See id. at § 1415(b)(3). When
complaints are received, "the parents involved in such
complaint shall have the opportunity for an impartial due
process hearing." Id. at § 1415(0.
Due process hearings in Delaware are conducted in a
manner typical of contested, adjudicatory hearings. The parties
include the parent(s), the local school board and the
Depa_htzent of Public Instruction. The hearing is conducted by
a three-member panel consisting of an attorney admitted to
practice in Delaware; an educator who is either certified in the
area of special education or who has been a post-secondary
educator in the area of programs for students with disabilities;
and a lay person with demonstrated interest in the education of
students with disabilities from an approved list compiled by the
Governor's Advisory Counsel for Exceptional Citizens.
Hearings are chaired by the attorney member of the panel.
education of children with disabilities conform to IDEA
requirements, as well as Delaware law.
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Due process hearings usually last from two to four days.
The school board and the Department of Public Instruction are
always represented by counsel. The hearing begins with
opening statements from each party. Evidence is then
presented through witnesses, who are subjected to direct and
cross-examination. Although the rules of evidence do not apply
strictly, the Chair rules on legal issues, the qualification of
experts and objections to relevance, materiality and
admissibility. Following the presentation of evidence, the
parties make closing statements and may be asked to file
written submissions on key questions.
On August 8, 1996, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel
("ODC") filed a petition with the Board requesting that Arons,
Watson and the Parent Information Center be declared to have
engaged in activities constituting the unauthorized practice of
law by representing families of children with disabilities in due
process hearings. While admitting the representation of at least
five such families in Delaware due process hearings, Appellants
denied that their activities, even if amounting to the practice of
law, constitute the unauthorized practice of law. They argued
that section 1415(h)( 1) of the IDEA permits the representations
in which they have engaged and preempts any state-law
proscription against the unauthorized practice of law that might
otherwise apply. That section provides that any party to a due
process hearing "shall be accorded .... the right to be
accompanied and advised by counsel and by individuals with
special knowledge or training with respect to the problems of
children with disabilities." They also claimed that Delaware is
alone among the fifty states in precluding non-lawyer
representation in these circumstances.
The matter was submitted to the Board on a stipulation -
of facts, including transcripts of due process hearings, briefs,
oral argument and post-hearing correspondence. On September
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24, 1999, the Board issued a written opinion concluding that
the IDEA does not authorize the practice of law by non-
lawyers, including Appellants, in due process hearings. This
appeal followed. Following the entry of this appeal, the United
States Department of Justice sought leave to appear as an
amicuscuriae.Leave Wasgrantedand the Department has filed
a brief in support of Appellants' position.
II
The present appeal poses the first occasion for this
Court to exercise its power of review of decisionsof the Board.
Under Supreme Court Rule 86(e), this Court will accept factual
findings by the Board so long as they are supported by
substantial evidence. We review on a de novobasis findings by
the Board related to legal issues. See Supr. Ct. R. 86(e).
Because the parties stipulated to the facts in this matter and the
only dispute relates to matters of law, this Court's review on all
issues is de novo.
Appellants' principal argument is that the IDEA
guarantees parents the right to have trained non-lawyers
advocate on their behalf in due process hearings. They contend
that the IDEA could hardly be clearer because it draws no
distinction between counsel and "individuals with special
knowledge or training with respect to the problems of children
with disabilities." To the extent that Delaware law conflicts
with federal law, the argument runs, Delaware law is displaced
and federal law governs.
The ODC responds that the IDEA unambiguously
supports its position. It argues that counsel have inherent and
presumptive representational ability and authority, while
educatio/tal consultants do not, and that the statutory language
of section 1415(h)neither creates nor implies an equivalence of
permissible roles for "counsel" and for "individuals with special
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knowledge or training."
Appellants and the ODC each argue that the pertinent
language of the IDEA in dispute -- "the right to be
accompanied and advised by counsel and by individuals with
special knowledge or training with respect to the problems of
children with disabilities" -- unambiguously supports their
respective positions. We do not share the parties' vision of
clarity. In our view, section 1415(h)(1) is ambiguous to the
extent it appears to confer joint authority on lawyers and non-
lawyers to accompany and advise parents and others affected
by the operation of the due process hearings provided under the
• IDEA. That being said, however, case law as well as statutory
history suppo_ the ODC's interpretation.
The pertinent language of section 1415(h)(1) has been
discussed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in Arons v. New Jersey State Board of Education, 3d.
Cir., 842 F.2d 58 (1988). In that case, Appellant Arons sought
an award of fees for her successful representation of parents in
a due process hearing in New Jersey, where state law allows
non-lawyers to represent parents in due process hearings. In
affirming a decision of the United States District.Court for New
Jersey that held that the New Jersey regulation authorizing such
fees permitted payment of only legal fees and not those of lay
advocates, the court of appeals rejected the statutory intent
argument advanced by Appellants here. The court explained:
The carefully drawn statutory language
does not authorize these specially qualified
individuals to render legal services. Although
the [IDEAl does give "any party to any hearing"
the right to "present evidence and confront,
cross-examine, and compel the attendance of
witnesses,' I those functions are not designated to
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be performed by lay advocates. Furthermore,
the statute does not use the word "represent" in
subsection (d)(1), as would be expected if
Congress intended to place expert and legal
counsel on the same footing.
Our search through the legislative
history has failed to uncover any indication that
Congress contemplated that the "individuals
with special knowledge" would act in a
representative capacity. The Senate Report
describes the "individual's" role as one of
consultation, with emphasis on the
responsibility to identify educational problems,
evaluate them, and determine proper
educational placement.
The provisions's [sic] text and history
thus cast substantial doubt on the plaintiffs
statement in her brief that "Congress intended
that no distinction be drawn between lawyers
and lay advocates."
842 F.2d at 62-63 (citations omitted).
Because the sole issue presented in .,Irons was whether
a lay advocate, whose authority to represent parents in the
IDEA proceedings was unchallenged, was entitled to seek fees
for her services, the Arons holding is contextually distinct from
the issue posed in this appeal. We find the analysis of the
federalism issue articulated by the court of appeals to be
persuasive. That court's reference to a 1975 Senate Report
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discussing the IDEA 2 is arguably dicta. Nevertheless, the
contents of the Senate Report describing the nonlawyer's role
as one of consultation is compelling evidence that Congress did
not intend non-lawyers to advocate on behalf of parents in due
process hearings. SeeArons, 842 F.2d at 62 (citing S. Rep. No.
94-168 (1975)).
Also supportive of the ODC's proposed interpretation of
the IDEA are a Senate Conference Report addressing the statute
and remarks made by the original author of the Senate bill,
Senator Harrison Williams of New Jersey. The Conference
Report states that in administrative due process hearings a party
is entitled to "the right to counsel and to be advised and
accompanied by individuals with special knowledge, training
or skills with respect to the problems of handicapped children."
S. Conf. Rep. No. 94-455 (1975). Senator Williams, in
providing a detailed analysis of the legislation before the
Senate on November 19, 1975, echoed those words verbatim.
See 121 Cong. Rec. 37416. This language confirms the clear
distinction, that Congress envisioned between the
representational role of counsel and the advisory role of non-
lawyers.
Recent amendments to the IDEA further bolster the
ODC's position. Pursuant to these amendments, one of the
safeguards required for agencies receiving federal funds under
2The Senate Report actually discusses the forerunner to
the IDEA, the Education of All Handicapped Children Act
("EHA"). Because the EHA and the IDEA are identical with
regard to the language relevant to the present discussion, this
opinion will not draw a distinction between the two Acts and
will refer to both as the IDEA.
A9
the IDEA is the adoption of procedures by the agency "that
require the parent of a child with a disability, or the attorney
representing the child, to provide notice" to the state or local
educational agency of certain information in connection with a
complaint. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6) and (7) (emphasis added).
The word "attorney" is an indisputable reference to a member
of the Bar and not a layperson, even if that layperson possesses
"special knowledge or training with respect to the problems of
children with disabilities." Equally supportive of the ODC's
position is the fact that while the IDEA has been amended
several times since Arons was decided, Congress has not
attempted to overrule that judicial interpretation.
Finally, Congress has explicitly included language in
other federal statutes to permit lay representation where such a
result was intended. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(7) (Food
Stamp Act provision allowing households in certification
process to "be represented by a person other than a member of
the household so long as that person has been clearly
designated as the representative .... and .... is an adult.").
Congress obviously knows how to provide such authority when
it wishes to do so. The absence of similar language in the IDEA
strongly suggests that Congress chose not to create a right to
lay representation in due process hearings.
Appellants place great reliance on, and request our
deference to, an interpretation of section 1415(h)(1) contained
in an April 8, 1981 letter of Theodore Sky, the then acting
General Counse! of the United States Department of. Education.
That letter was written in response to a request by the
Superintendent of Public Instruction for the State of
Washington for a "legal analysis regarding the role of lay
advocates in educational agency administrative hearings"
conducted under the IDEA. The superintendent suggested that
the IDEA's language indicates that non-lawyers are not in fact
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authorized to engage in activities conventionally viewed as
legal representation, such as examining and cross-examining
witnesses. In its response, the Department of Education rejected
the superintendent's reading of the IDEA, concluding that
notwithstanding the Senate Conference Report and the absence
in section 1415(h)(1) of the term "represent," lay advocates are
permitted to represent parties at due process hearings and
appeals under the IDEA.
In reaching its conclusion that section 1415(h)(1)
authorizes lay representation in due process hearings, the
Department of Education relied on three factors. First, it
reasoned that because no "bifurcation of function" is set forth
in the statute between counsel on the one hand and individuals •
with special knowledge or training on the other, the permiss!ble
roles of the two must be the same. Second, the Department
looked to the remarks of Congressman George Miller and
Senator Alan Cranston, both of California. Congressman
Miller, a member of the Subcommittee on Select Education
which prepared the House bill, explained section 1415(h)(1 ) to
•his colleagues by observing that parents "will have the right to
be accompanied by counsel or other qualified individuals who
possess 'special knowledge or training with respect to the
education of handicapped children.'" 121 Cong. Rec. 25539
(1975). Senator Cranston noted that the "procedural
requirements [of the IDEA] are consistent with the existing
California statutory and master plan requirements on this
subject," which, at the time, permitted the lay representation of
parties in California due process hearings. 121 Cong. Rec.
37419 (1975). Third, the Department relied upon the fact that
lay representation had been authorized by Congress for certain
other types of administrative proceedings.
Becat_se sectionl415(h)(1) is arguably ambiguous, the
Department's interpretation of that section is entitled to some
All
level of deference by this Court. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,467 U.S. 837, 843-
45, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984). Here, however,
that level of deference is modest. Where Congress has not
expressly delegated "authority to an agency to elucidate a
specific provision of the statute by regulation," deference is due
only to a "reasonable" administrative interpretation. Id. at 843-
44. Further, less deference is due to informal agency
interpretations, such as that expressed in the Sky letter, than to
formal agency regulations adopted after a notice and comment
period. See Cleary v. Waldman,3d Cir., 167 F.3d 801,807-08
(1999).
Even if this Court were required to give greater
deference to the Department of Education's interpretation of
section 1415(h)(1), it is doubtful whether that interpretation
could withstand the sheer weight of the legal and factual
support for the opposite conclusion. The Department's analysis
of the statute is subject to criticism. First, in concluding that the
permissible roles of counsel and individuals with special
knowledge or training with respect to the problems of children
with disabilities must be the same, the Depathnent overlooked
the inherent and presumptive representational authority with
which counsel are cloaked and non-lawyers are not. Second, the
Department selectively chose statements made by two
lawmakers, while placing no weight on the Senate Report, the
Senate Conference Report, or the remarks of Senator Williams.
Such an approach renders that aspect of the Department's
analysis questionable. See generally Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm'n v. GTESylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118, 64 L. Ed. 2d
766, 100 S. Ct. 2051 (1980) ("Contemporaneous remarks of a
single legislator who sponsors a bill are not controlling in
analyzing legislative history."). Finally, the Depaatment's
reliance upon the fact that lay representation had been
authorized by Congress for certain other types of administrative
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proceedings is puzzling because as previously noted, that factor
actually supports the opposite conclusion- that Congress knew
how to authorize lay representation when it wished to do so.
III
In addition to their statutory interpretation argument,
Appellants contend even if the IDEA does not expressly entitle
them to represent parents in due process hearings, due process
would be violated by forbidding parents from having non-
lawyer representation in hearings under the IDEA. They note
that due process hearings are formal adversarial proceedings in
which the State of Delaware funds the attorneys who argue for
the parents' adversaries. Denying parents and children access to
"the only assistance available to them," the argument goes
raises "unyielding due process problems. '°
The parties agree that Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976), governs the
determination of what process is due to safeguard a child's
fundamental right to education. Under Mathews, courts must
consider: (i) the importance of the individual interest involved;
3This Court has some difficulty understanding the
applicability of this argument to the matter at hand. It is not
alleged that forbidding parents from having non-lawyer
assistance in hearings under the IDEA will deprive the
Appellants of their due process rights, nor are the parents,
whose rights are purportedly abridged, parties to this action.
Appellants appear to be acting as surrogates in pressing the due
process claim. We will address Appellants' argument, however,
in the context of adopting a statutory construction that will
avoid constitutional entanglements. See DeBartolo Corp. v.
Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568, 575, 99 L. Ed. 2d 645, 108 S. Ct. 1392 (1988).
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(ii) the value of specific procedural safeguards to that interest;
and (iii) the governmental interest in fiscal and administrative
efficiency. See id. at 335.
The ODC acknowledges that the individual liberty
interest at stake in due process hearings under the IDEA is
substantial. It also concedes that some parents will forego their
statutory fight to contest changes to their child's education plan
because they cannot afford legal counsel and will opt not to
proceed pro se due to the complexity of the hearings and the
prospect of facing two sets of government lawyers. The ODC
submits, however, that Appellants "grossly and unfairly"
exaggerate the risk that Delaware will deprive children of that
interest unless the children and their parents are allowed to be
represented by lay ad_'ocates. In this regard, the ODC notes that
Delaware's Community Legal Aid Society has, on occasion,
provided representation at IDEA due process hearings to
parents and children whose cases satisfy the organization's case
acceptance criteria. The ODC further contends that the State of
Delaware has a compelling interest in regulating the practice of
law within its boundaries, and that this interest significantly
outweighs any potential benefit that some individual parents
and children may obtain through the services of lay advocates.
We agree. A balancing of the Mathews factors suggests
that procedural due process would not be violated by forbidding
parents from having non-lawyer representation in hearings
under the IDEA. While there is no question of the importance
of the individual interests involved, it seems clear that par/ies
to an IDEA hearing are already provided with substantial
procedural safeguards. The hearings are conducted in a manner
typical of contested, adversarial adjudicatory hearings,
including the direct and crross-examination of witnesses and the
required exchange of witness lists and documents in advance of
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the bearing. 4 While we recognize that Appellants possess some
expertise in the area of the educational needs of disabled
children, they admittedly lack the training and skills that
lawyers are expected to exhibit in matters of evidence and
procedure. Second, it seems logical that the third Mathews
factor, i.e., "governmental interest in fiscal and administrative
efficiency," would encompass this State's exclusive authority to
regulate the practice of law. It would also implicate the ODC's
argument that lay advocates are unregulated and, unlike
members of the Bar, are not answerable to the disciplinary
process that operates as an arm of this Court. This Court does
not exercise its inherent authority to regulate the practice of law
for the purpose of protecting the financial interests of the
lawyer. Our role is to insure that the public will enjoy the
representation of individuals who have been found to possess
the necessary skills and training to represent others.
Finally, the record does not support Appellants'
assertion that parents and children will be denied access to "the
only assistance available to them." The stipulation of the parties
does state that the five families represented by the Appellants
looked diligently to find legal counsel to represent them on a
reduced-cost or pro bono basis prior to obtaining Appellants'
services. But the record also reflects that Delaware's
Community Legal Aid Society has in the past provided
representation at IDEA due process hearings to parents and
children whose cases satisfy the organization's case acceptance
4We also believe that the three member panel consisting
of an attorney, an educator in the area of special education, and
a lay person with demonstrated interest in the education of
students with disabilities, affords parents an unbiased hearing
and, coupled with the above mentioned safeguards, adequate
structural protection.
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criteria. The record ffimher reflects that the State Superintendent
of Public Instruction and the district involved are required to
provide information to parents regarding the availability of free
or low-cost legal services which may be available. If it could be
demonstrated that an unmet need exists and that the local bar
could not adequately respond, this Court would consider the
adoption of a rule allowing lay representation in a certain
limited class of cases. See, e.g., Supt. Ct. R. 57 (permitting civil
actions before Justice of the Peace Courts in which an artificial
entity or public body is a party to be prosecuted and/or
defended by an officer or employee of that artificial entity or
public body, who need not be an attorney duly licensed to
practice law in this State). At present, however, such a need has
not been demonstrated.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, the language of section 1415(h)(1)
cannot be interpreted as granting any clear fight to lay
representation. This conclusion renders moot Appellants' claim
that the IDEA preempts any state-law proscription against the
unauthorized practice of law that might otherwise apply to the
activities of such individuals with special knowledge or training
in this context. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the
Board.
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BOARD ON THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE oF DELAWARE
IN THE MATTER OF: MARILYN ARONS, RUTH
WATSON and PARENT INFORMATION CENTER OF
NEW JERSEY, INC., Respondents.
No. UPL-4, 1996
(UPL File Nos. 94-12; 95-17)
Mary M Johnston, Chief Counsel, and Michael S. McGinniss
(argued), Disciplinary Counsel, Wilmington, Delaware,
attorneys for Petitioner Office of Disciplinary Counsel
Walter Speed Rowland, Wilmington, Delaware, and David C.
Vladeck (argued) and Amanda Frost, Public Citizen Litigation
Group, Washington, D.C., attorneys for Respondents Marilyn
Arons, Ruth Watson and Parent Information Center of New
Jersey, Inc.
Before: Samuel A. Nolen, Esquire, Panel Chair, and Cheris
Dawn Congo and John W. Paradee, Esquire, Panel Members
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION
On August 8, 1996, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel
("ODC") filed a petition with the Board on the Unauthorized
Practice of Law requesting that the Board declare that
respondents Marilyn Arons, Ruth Watson and Parent
Information Center of New Jersey, Inc. have engaged in
activities constituting the unauthorized practice of law by
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representing families of children with disabilities in. "due
process" hearings held by the Delaware Department of Public
Instruction pursuant to the federal Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.
Respondenls timely appeared and responded to the
petition. While admitting the representation of at least five such
families in Delaware due process hearings, respondents deny
that their activities, even if amounting to the practice of law,
constitute the unauthorized practice of law. It is the
respondents' assertion that Section 1415(h)(1) of IDEA, 20
U.S.C. § 1415(h)(1), which provides that any party to a due
process hearing "shall be accorded ... the right to be
accompanied and advised by counsel and by individuals with
special knowledge or training with respect to the problems of
children with disabilities ...," authorizes the representations in
which they have engaged and preempts any state-law
proscription against the unauthorized practice of law that might
otherwise apply to the activities of such individuals with special
knowledge or training in this context.
The matter was submitted to the Panel on a stipulation
of facts including transcripts of due process hearings, briefs,
oral argument, and post-hearing correspondence. For the
reasons set forth below, we conclude that IDEA does not
authorize the practice of law by nonlawyers in due process
hearings.
***
Respondents Marilyn Arons and Ruth Watson are the
founder and Executive Director, respectively, of respondent
Parent Information Center of New Jersey, Inc ("Parent
Information Center"). Parent Information Center is a non-profit
organization founded in 1977 which provides advice,
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counseling and advocacy services to families of children,with
disabilities. Parent Information Center operates largely through
volunteers. It does not receive, government or corporate
funding, but derives income through membership dues
(assessed on the basis of ability to pay) and contributions. Ms.
Arons is an educator and curriculum specialist by training and
has completed the course work necessary for a Ph.D. in
Neuroscience and Education from Teachers College, Columbia
University, New York. Neither Ms. Arons nor Ms. Watson is
a lawyer.
IDEA was enacted with the purpose of"assur[ing] that
all children with disabilities have available to them.., a free
approp/iate public education which emphasizes special
education and related services designed to meet their unique
needs" and "that the rights of children with disabilities and
parents of such children are protected." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1).
In IDEA, Congress devised a system of funding special
education and evaluative procedures, 20 U.S.C. § 1411, and
required states and localities that accept funding to create and
utilize an elaborate plan for providing special education that
identifies children who need special educational assistance and
determines what assistance each child needs. 20 U.S.C. §§
1412-1414.
Delaware participates in and receives federal funds
under IDEA and, accordingly, conforms its proceedings
governing special education of children with disabilities to
IDEA requirements, as well as to Delaware law.
IDEA is intended to "ensure that children with
disabilities and their parents are guaranteed procedural
safeguards with respect to the provision of free appropriate
public education..." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a). States and localities
must allow "the parents of a child with a disability to examine
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all records relating to such child ... and the provision of a free
appropriate public education to such child...." 20 U.S.C § 1415
(b)(1) "[W]ritten prior notice [must be given] to the parents of
the child" whenever schools either propose to change or
initiate, or refuse to change or initiate, the identification,
evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the
provision of a free appropriate public education service to the
child (commonly referred to as the "IEP"). 20 U.S.C. §
1415(b)(3)(B). The parents must have the "opportunity to
present complaints with respect to any matter" relating to the
IEP. 20 U.S.C. § 14i5(b)(6). When complaints are received,
"the parents involved in such complaint shall have an
opportunity for an impartial due process hearing," 20 U.S.C. §
1415(0, and for an impartial review on appeal to a state
educational agency. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g). IDEA specifies,
among other things, the following procedural rights of parties
to IDEA due process hearings:
Any party to a hearing conducted pursuant to
subsection (f) or (k) of this section, or an appeal
conducted pursuant to subsection (g) of this
section, shall be accorded-
(1) the right to be accompanied
and advised by counsel and by
individuals with special
knowledge or training with
respect to the problems of
children with disabilities;
(2) the right to present evidence
and confront, cross-examine,
and compel the attendance of
witnesses;
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(3) the right to a written, or, at
the option of _e parents,
electronic verbatim record of
such heating; and
(4) the tight to written, or, at the
option of the parents, electronic
findings of fact and decisions
(which findings and decisions
shall be made available to the
public consistent with the
requirements of section 1417(c)
of this title (relating to the
confidentiality of data,
information, and records) and
shall also be transmitted to the
advisory panel established
pursuant to section 1412(a)(2 1)
of this title).
20 U.S.C. § 1415(h).
Consistent with its obligations under IDEA, the
Delaware Department of Public Instruction provides due
process hearings to address the complaints of parents relating
to IEPs. Detailed regulations address the initiation of such
hearings, the composition and qualifications of the heating
panel and its members, the conduct of the hearing and the tights
of the parties thereto. Delaware Administrative Procedures
Manual, 72 000 CDR 002-75 through -78 (Weil Pub. 1996).
These regulatory requirements mirror IDEA in providing that
"_Anyparty to a heating has the tight to: (1) be accompanied
and advised by counsel or [sic] by individuals with knowledge
or special training with respect to the problems of students with
disabilities; [and] (2) present evidence, confront, cross-examine
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•and compel the attendance of witnesses...." /d at 002-77.
The State Superintendent of Public Instruction and the
district involved are required to provide information regarding
the availability of free or low-cost legal services which may be
available, ld. at 002-75, 002-77-78. Insofar as the record
discloses, however, the only legal services organization that has
provided legal representation by counsel at Delaware IDEA due
process hearings is Delaware's Community Legal Aid Society,
• Inc., which has, on occasion, provided representation at IDEA
due process hearings to parents and children whose cases
satisfy the organization's case acceptance criteria.
Due process hearings are conducted in a manner typical
of contested, adversarial adjudicatory hearings. The parties
consist of parents; the local school board, which is always
represented by counsel; and the Department of Publie
Instruction, represented by a lawyer from the Office of
Attorney General. The hearing panel must consist of one
.attorney admitted to practice in Delaware; one educator
certified in the area of special education or who has been a
post-secondary educator in the area of programs for students
with disabilities; and one layperson with demonstrated interest
in the education of students with disabilities who is included on
an approved list compiled by the Governor's Advisory Couneil
for Exceptional Citizens. Hearings are chaired by the attorney
member of the panel, who is charged with writing the panel's
decision. Although the rules of evidence do not strictly apply,
the Chair makes rulings on matters such as (i) objections (e.g.,
relevance, materiality, and admissibility); (ii) issues of law
(e.g., burden of proof); and (iii) qualifications of experts. In
advanee of the hearing, exhibits must be marked and the parties
must exchange witness lists and all documents to be offered.
Due process hearings begin with opening statements
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from each party. Because the school board bears the burden of
going forward, it presents its case first. Evidence is presented
through witnesses, who are subjected to direct and cross
examination. After the school board rests, the Department of
Public Instruction is afforded an Opportunity to present its case.
The parents put their case on last, 'although there is then an
opportunity for rebuttal testimony. Following the presentation
of evidence, the parties give closing statements to the panel and
may be asked to file written submissions on key questions. On
average, hearings last from two to four days.
Although due process hearings have the trappings of
formal adjudications, the issues presented for resolution
typically involve complex factual questions relating to the
unique learning needs of the disabled child. The fact witnesses
who appear at these hearings are typically school officials
(teachers, guidance counselors, and principals), and the expert
witnesses are generally neurologists, psychiatrists,
psychologists, physicians, and others with expertise in
educational and developmental sciences.
Ms. Arons and Ms. Watson are nonlawyers with
"special knowledge or training with respect to the problems of
children with disabilities." As part of their advice, counseling
and advocacy services to families of children with disabilities,
respondents frequently represent such families in IDEA due
process hearings. Parent Information Center has handled
approximately 500 due process hearings on behalf of families
of children with disabilities, mostly in New York and New
Jersey but also in Pennsylvania and, on at least five occasions,
in Delaware) It is not asserted that the families of children with
_In Delaware hearings relating to Nicholas DeCrease,
Kevin Coale, Matthew Hayes and Shawn White were handled
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disabilities whom respondents have represented at due process
hearings in Delaware believed that respondents were lawyers,
or that respondents held themselves out as such. Indeed it is
stipulated that these families sought legal counsel, but could not
find an attorney willing torepresent them on a standard fee-for-
service basis, or to represent them on some reduced cost or pro
bono basis. At the Delaware due process hearings identified
above, Ms. Arons or Ms. Watson presented the parents'
positions to the panel, including by making opening statements,
examining and cross-examining witnesses, making and arguing
evidentiary objections, introducing exhibits, proffering other
records and documents, presenting procedural motions such as
motions for summary judgment, submitting briefs and other
documents and arguing for particular remedies.
In Challenging respondents' representation of parents in
due process hearings, ODC does not seek to prove that the
respondents did not provide diligent and effective service to she
families involved. For their part, respondents do not argue that
their role in the due process hearings at issue did not constitute
the "practice of law," which in any event is commonly
understood to include such activities as those engaged in by
respondents and listed above in their "'pursuit, as an advocate
for another, of a legal remedy within the jurisdiction of a quasi
judicial tribunal."' Delaware State Bar Ass'n v. Alexander, Del.
Supr., 386 A.2d 652, 661 (1978), quoting TumulO_ v.
Rosenblum, N.J. Supr., 48 A.2d 850, 852 (1946). Accordingly,
the central issue for our decision is whether IDEA preempts the
Delaware Supreme Court's authority to prohibit nonlawyers
from practicing law in due process hearings by virtue of the
provision in 20 U.S.C. § 1415(h)(1) requiring that parents be
by Ms. Arons. The hearing in Delaware relating to Phillip Russ
was handled by Ms. Watson.
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accorded "the right to be accompanied and advised ... by
individuals with special knowledge and training with respect to
the problems of children with disabilities."
The Delaware Supreme Court has inherent jurisdiction
over the practice of law within Delaware. Delaware State Bar
Ass'n v. Alexander, 386 A.2d at 654; In re Appeal of
Infotechnology, Inc., DeE Supr., 582 A.2d 215,220 (1990); In
re Petition ofNenno, Del. Supr., 472 A.2d 815, 819 (1983)
(noting significance of separation of powers doctrine). While
aspects of the Court's authority are referenced by statute, see,
e.g., 10 Del. C. § 1906, the source of this inherent authority
rests in the jurisprudence of England transplanted to the
Colonies prior to the time of their separation from the Crown.
In view of the exhaustive treatment of this subject by the
Supreme Court in Delaware Optometric Corp. v. Sherwood,
Del. Supr., 128 A.2d 812, 815-817 (1957), it is unnecessary to
recount in detail the historical development of authorization or
licensure to practice law as a prerequisite to practice that
profession. It is pertinent to observe, however, that from early
times it has been recognized as necessary to the public welfare
to regulate and oversee those who seek to represent the interests
of others before tribunals. Delaware Optometric Corp. v.
Sherwood, 128 A.2d at 816. As our Supreme Court has found:
The justification for the existence of this
[regulatory] power inherently in the courts is the
necessity for the proper administration of
justice, which can be achieved only if the
procedures and practices of the courts are fair
and reasonable, and the officers of the court, the
lawyers, are competent and ethical. Thus it is
that by rule of court requirements are
A25
established for admission to the Bar, and
standards of ethical conduct established, to
which all lawyers must conform to continue in
the practice of law. The policing of these
requirements is achieved by the inherent power
of the court to discipline lawyers for violations.
In re Member of the Bar, Del. Supr., 257 A.2d 382, 383
(1969). 2
Under the common law rule thus in existence in
Delaware since before the separation of the Colonies from the
Crown, the "admission of attorneys to practice, and the
2There are, of course, those who portray limitation of
the right to practice law as monopolistic or oligarchic economic
protectionism benefitting those already authorized to practice.
While not explicitly advanced by respondents as an argument,
it is alluded to in the briefing. ("The purpose of UPL laws is to
protect the public, not to preserve the lawyer monopoly over
the delivery of legal services.") This is "not a pertinent
consideration in the case before us; the stipulated facts establish
that there was no universe of lawyers willing to take on the
cases handled by respondents on a standard fee-for-service
basis. It would in any event not be a pertinent consideration in
Delaware since, at least in Delaware, it is well established that
the right or authority to practice law is not a franchise which
may be protected as a property right against competition.
Delaware Optometric Corp. v. Sherwood, 128 A.2d at 817
("The lawyer's license ... is not the grant of a property right
which the individual may protect by injunction [against
unauthorized competition]. To regard it otherwise is to make
the legal profession a business, and to destroy the very reason
for its existence").
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exclusion of unauthorized persons from practice lie within the
province of [the Supreme] court. A violation of [the Supreme]
court's exclusive fight to license attorneys at law by presuming
to practice law without such license is a contempt of its
authority and punishable as such." Delaware Optometric Corp.
v. Sherwood, 128 A.2d 816-17)
The policing of the Bar and, thus, of the practice of law
in general takes numerous forms. For example, as the Court
itself noted in upholding mandatory annual assessments for the
benefit of the Clients' Security Trust Fund (now known as the
Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection):
It must be borne in mind that lawyers,
constituting the Board of Bar Examiners by
appointment of this Court, control admissions to
the Bar. In a sense, therefore, the profession
holds out to the public all its members in good
standing as being competent, honest and
devoted to their clients' interests. This, it seems
to us, is in the nature of a collective
representation by the Bar to the public, and
justifies a collective acceptance of responsibility
when one of its members is false to his oath and
the common precepts of honesty.
In re Member of the Bar, 257 A.2d at 3 83. Similarly, lawyers
are subject to detailed rules of professional conduct (see
Delaware Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct), rules
3This approach is not unique to Delaware, but widely
accepted in many other states. See In the Matter of Thomas
.4lexander Jr., Bd. on the Unauthorized Practice of Law, UPL-
2, 1992 (July 8, 1993) (Opinion) and cases collected therein.
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requiting continuing education (see Delaware Rules for
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education), annual registration
requirements (see Supreme Court Rule 69), rules relating to
abandoned or unclaimed client trust funds (see Supreme Court
Rule 73), rules governing segregation of and accounting for
client.funds (see Rule 1. 15, Delaware Lawyers' Rules of
Professional Conduct), and rules restricting and regulating
advertising and other communications about legal services that
might create unjustified expectations or that might otherwise
mislead (see Rules 7.1 - 7.5, Delaware Lawyers' Rules of
Professional Conduct)• It is undisputed that these restrictions,
limitations, requirements and client protections are not
generally applicable to nonlawyers..
• Respondents' contention that their practice of law
without admission to practice nonetheless constitutes the
authorized practice of law under IDEA rests principally upon
their assertion that (i) 20 U.S.C. § 1415(h)(1) on its face
authorizes "individuals with special knowledge or training with
respect to the problems of children with disabilities" to
represent parties to due process hearings, by virtue of its
conferral of a tight to such parties to be accompanied and
advised by such individuals, and (ii) IDEA thereby preempts
under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2, the traditional regulation of the
practice of law by the Delaware Supreme Court.
We do "notread Section 1415(h) as providing that a
party to a due process hearing may be "represented" by
individuals with special knowledge or training with respect to
the problems of children with disabilities. It provides only that
a party may be "accompanied and advised" by such persons.
Where Congress (or an agency to which Congress has granted
clear regulatory authority) has intended to allow representation
of parties by nonlawyers in administrative or other proceedings,
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it has.been explicit in its language doing so. See, e.g., Sperry v.
Florida ex reL Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 384 (1963) (statute
providing that the Commissioner of Patents "may prescribe
regulations governing the recognition and conduct of agents,
attorneys, or other persons representing applicants or other
persons before the Patent Office" authorized Commissioner to
provide by regulation that patent applicant "may be represented
by an attorney or agent authorized to practice before the Patent
Office") (italics in opinion); 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(7) (1988) and
7 CFR § 273.15(p)(2) (Food Stamp Act provision and
regulation allowing "households" in certification process to "be
represented ... by a person other than a member of the
household so long as the person has been clearly designated as
the representative ... and ... is an adult" and in grievance
proceedings to "present the case or have it presented by a legal
counsel or other person"); 45 CFR § 205.10(a)(3)(iii) (1997)
(provision regulating state plans under Social Security Act
allowing applicants and recipients to be "represented by an
authorized representative, such as legal counsel, relative, friend
or other spokesman"); 38 U.S.C. § 5904(a) ("The Secretary
may recognize any individual as an agent or attorney for the
preparation, presentation and prosecution of claims under laws
administered by the Secretary" relating to veterans' benefits). In
IDEA, by contrast, Congress did not clearly reflect by the
words chosen that lay representation was being authorized.
Rather, it used words -- "accompanied and advised" -- which do
not ordinarily convey the concept of representation. 4
4We do not accept the argument that, in lumping
"counsel" and "individuals having special knowledge or
training" together in Section 1415(h)(1), the statutory language
implies an equivalence of permissible roles for the two
categories of persons. Counsel have inherent and presumptive
representational authority, while individuals with special
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Accordingly, we find that the plain language of Section
1415(h)(I) does not authorize individuals having special
knowledge Or tr/fining with respect to the problems of children
with disabilities to represent parties in due process hearings.
While it is a basic tenet of statutory construction that
resort to extrinsic aids to construction is unnecessary in the
absence of ambiguity, and we find no ambiguity in the carefully
drawn language of the statute, we note that the Joint
Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference set
forth in the Senate Conference Report, which addressed IDEA
(then known as the Education of All Handicapped Children
Act) as finally adopted, explained the due process provisions as
providing the "right to counsel and to be advised and
accompanied by individuals with special knowledge, training
or skills with respect to the problems of handicapped children."
S. Conf. Rep. No. 94-445, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1480, 1503. This language confirms the clear distinction
between the representational role of counsel and the advisory
role of nonlawyers which we perceive.
Our finding is consistent with that expressed by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Arons
v. New Jersey State Board of Education, 842 F.2d 58 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 942 (1988). There, Ms. Arons sought an
knowledge or training with respect to the problems of children
with disabilities do not. Indeed, it is an ancient and original
function of counsel to represent others in pleading cases -- to
stand in the client's stead -- while it is no traditional part of the
role of individuals with special knowledge or training in the
problems of children with disabilities to do so, so far as this
record reveals. Congress may be presumed to have understood
this.
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award of fees for her successful representation of parents in a
due process hearing, but was denied fees on the ground that the
New Jersey regulation authorizing such fees permitted payment
only of legal fees, and not fees of lay advocates. 5 Ms. Arons
appealed, arguing that the no-lay-fee rule stood as an obstacle
to the full accomplishment of the IDEA objectives (because the
rule would discourage parties from using nonlawyer
representatives which Ms. Arons claimed (and here claims)
Section 1415(h)(1) authorized) and was therefore preempted by
IDEA.
The Third Circuit squarely rejected this view. It said:
The carefully drawn statutory language
does not authorize these specially qualified
individuals to render legal services. Although
the Act does give "[a]ny party to any hearing"
the right to "present evidence and confront,
cross-examine, and compel the attendance of
witnesses," Id. § 1415(d)(2) [now (h)(2)], those
functions are not designated to be performed by
lay advocates. Furthermore, the statute does not
use the Word "represent" in subsection ' (d)(1)
[now (h)(1)], as would be expected if Congress
intended to place expert and legal counsel on
the same footing.
Our search through the legislative
5By regulation, New Jersey permits -- as a matter of
state law -- the representation of parents in due process
hearings by nonlawyers. Indeed respondents advise that
Delaware is alone among the fifty states in precluding
nonlawyer representation in these circumstances.
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history has failed to uncover any indication that
Congress contemplated that the "individuals
with special knowledge" would act in a
representative capacity. The Senate Report
describes the "individual['s]" role as one of
consultation, with emphasis on the
responsibility to identify educational problems,
evaluate them, and determine proper
educational placement. S. Rep. No. 168, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1975 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News pp. 1425, 1470-71.
The provisions's text and history thus
cast substantial doubt on the plaintiff's
statement in her brief that "Congress intended
that no distinction be drawn between lawyers
and lay advocates."
842 F.2d at 62. Whether or not binding in a precedential way,
we find this analysis persuasive and note that in none of the
amendments of IDEA adopted since Arons was decided has
Congress attempted legislatively to overrule this judicial
interpretation.
Respondents argue that, notwithstanding the foregoing,
we are bound to give controlling deference to an interpretation
of the "accompanied and advised" language found in an April
8, 1981 letter of Theodore Sky, then Acting General Counsel of
the United States Depa._ment of Education (the "Sky Letter"),
in which he concluded that notwithstanding the Senate
Conference Report and the absence in Section 1415(h)(1) of the
term "represent," lay advocates, are permitted to represent
parties at administrative hearings and appeals. Letter of
Theodore Sky, Acting General Counsel Department of
Education, to the Honorable Frank B. Brouillet. Superintendent
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of Public Instruction, State of Washington (April 8, 1981).
In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the United StatesSupreme
Court addressed deference to administrative statutory
interpretations. Under the Court's analysis, the first question is
"whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question
at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter ...." 467 U.S. at 842. If the statute is silent or ambiguous
on the issue, however, a court must determine whether the
agency's construction is permissible. Id. at 843. If Congress
expressly delegated "authority to the agency to elucidate a
specific provision of the statute by regulation ... [s]uch
legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they
are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute."
Id. at 843-44. If the legislative delegation is merely implicit,
however, deference is due only to a "reasonable" administrative
interpretation. Id. at 844. Less deference is due to informal
agency interpretations, which is what is involved here, than to
formal agency regulations adopted after a notice and comment
period. See, e.g., Cleary ex rel. Cleary v. Waldman, 167 F.3d
• 801,807-08 (3d Cir. 1999); Converse County Sch. Dist. No.
Two v. Pratt, 993 F. Supp. 848;859 n. 4 (D.Wyo. 1997).
In Section 1415(h)(1) Congress has spoken directly to
the precise question of who may assist parties in such hearings:
counsel, who have inherent representational authority, and
individuals with special knowledge or training with respect to
the problems of children with disabilities, who do not. The
usage of the phrase "accompanied and advised" rather than the
term "represented" or words of similar import, when viewed
against the long-established regulation of the practice of law
under State, not federal or administrative, authority, and the
evidence that .Congress well knew how to authorize lay
representation in clear terms when it wished to do so, establish
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that Congress did not Intend to mandate a right to lay
representation in due process hearings. 6 Congress chose not to
include language in Section 1415(h)(1) according
representational authority to the identified category of
nonlawyers. Thus we conclude that, because the intent of
Congress is clear, deference to the conclusion stated in the Sky
Letter is not required.
Even if the Congressional intent were less than clear,
Congress did not explicitly delegate to the United States
Department of Education the responsibility to determine issues
of authority to practice law, that is, to elucidate whether under
the "accompanied and advised" clause parties to due process
hearings are entitled to be represented by nonlawyers.
Therefore, only a "reasonable" administrative interpretation
requires deference. Accordingly we next review the Sky
Letter's analysis of the question.
In reaching its conclusion that Section 1415(h)(1)
authorizes lay representation in due process hearings the Sky
Letter relied on three factors. First, it reasoned that because no
"bifurcation of function" is set forth in the statute between
counsel on the one hand and individuals with special
6The ease with which Congress could have made its
intention clear had it wished to authorize lay representation is
illustrated by the approach taken in the New York
Administrative Code, which provides that "the parties to the
proceeding may be represented by legal counsel or by
individuals with special knowledge or training ... and may be
accompanied by other persons of their choice." Connors v.
Mills, 34 F. Supp. 2d 795, 807 (N.D.N.Y. 1998), quoting N.Y.
Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8 § 200.5(c)(5) (1998) (italics
supplied).
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knowledge or training with respect to the problems of children
with disabilities on the other, the permissible roles of the two
must be the same. In reaching this conclusion, however, Sky
overlooked the inherent and presumptive representational
authority with which counsel are cloaked, traditional authority
• which nonlawyers simply do not share. For the reasons
expressed in footnote 4 above, this factor although overlooked
is highly relevant.
Second, Sky placed no weight on the Senate Conference
Report, but rested his interpretation on the remarks of a single
Senator (Senator Cranston), who noted that the "procedural
requirements [of IDEAl ... are consistent with the existing
California statutory rand master plan requirements on this
subject." 121 Cong. Rec. 37418-9 (1975) (italics ours). SkY
then observed that under California practice at the tune, lay
advocates represented parties in California due process
hearings. 7 Leaving to one side reliance upon a general
statement of procedural consistency between two statutory
schemes to prove an intention that there be identity between the
two schemes on a narrow and specific subsidiary point, Sky's
reliance on the remarks of a single Senator to the exclusion of
a distinction evident in the Senate Conference Report renders
his analysis unpersuasive. See Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n
v. GTE Sylvania lnc., 447 U.S. 102 (1980)
("[C]ontemporaneous remarks of a single legislator who
sponsors a bill are not controlling in analyzing legislative
7Subsequently, however, it has been held that not even
an attorney may appear in a representative capacity at a due
process hearing unless he or she is a member of the California
Bar. See Z.A. v. San Bruno Park Sch. Dist., 165 F.3d 1273 (9th
Cir. 1999).
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history"), s The "well-established presumption that Congress is
understood to legislate against a background of common-law
principles," of which the "rule that a non-lawyer may not
represent another person in court is a venerable lone]" would to
the contrary lead a court a court to be "reluctant to assume,
absent strong evidence to the contrary, that Congress intended
to override this well-settled rule using ambiguous statutory
language" Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of Educ, 161 F.3d 225,
231-32 (3d Cir. 1998).
Third, and finally, Sky relied upon the fact that lay
representation has been authorized by Congress for certain
other type s of administrative proceedings. But this conclusion
failed to consider that in the examples relied upon by Sky the
intention to allow lay representation was explicit. Indeed it is
these very examples, some of which we have detailed above in
concluding that Congress knew how. to authorize lay
representation when it wished to do so, and others of which are
self-evidently to the same effect, that demonstrate that
Congress did not choose in this instance to authorize lay
representation.
For these reasons we cannot conclude that the
interpretation of Section 1415(h)(1) reached in the Sky Letter
SSky also failed to note or credit the remarks of Senator
Williams, who (in.contrast to Senator Cranston) provided a
detailed analysis of the legislation and remarked, as the Senate
Conference Report had, that parents would have "the right to
counsel and to be advised and accompanied by individuals with
special knowledge, training or skills with respect to the
problems of handicapped children." 121 Cong. Rec. 37416.
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is one to which we must grant controlling deference. 9 We turn
next to respondents' argument that to the extent Delaware law
proscribes their practice of law in due process hearings as
unauthorized, principles offffederalpreemption arising under the
Supremacy Cl_/use of the United States Constitution override
Delaware's regulatory authority.
Under principles of federal preemption, state law may
be preempted in either, of two general ways. First, "[i]f
Congress evidences an intent to occupy a given field, any state
law falling within that field is preempted." Silkwood v. Kerr -
McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984), reh_denied, 465 U.S.
1074 (1984). Second, if Congress "has not entirely displaced
state regulation over the matter in question, state law is still
preempted to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law,
that is, when it is impossible to comply with both state and
federal law, or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress." Id. (citation omitted). See also Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers. Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-3 (1963);
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). In these latter
categories, "the proper approach is to reconcile 'the operation
of both statutory schemes with one another rather than holding
one completely ousted.'" Wylain.Inc. v. TRE Corp., Del. Ch.,
412 A.2d 338, 346 (1979), quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce
9Two other letters expressing administrative
interpretations have been brought to our attention: Request of
Eig, EHLR [1987 Transfer Binder] 211:270, Supp. 57 (CCR
Publishing Co.); Virginia Dep't of Education, EHLR [1987
Transfer Binder] 257:349, Supp. 84 (CCR Publishing Co.).
Both are brief and conclusory, failing to express any
administrative analysis which might otherwise call for
deference.
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Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 127 (1973). See
also Shamrock Assocs. v. Texas Am. Energy Corp., Del. Ch.,
517 A.2d 658,661-62
"Federal statutes impinging upon important state
interests 'cannot ... be construed without regard to the
implications of our dual system of government....'" BEP v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 544 (1993), reh'g
denied, 512 U.S. 1247 (1994), quoting Frankfurter, Some
Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527,
539-40 (1947). Thus, there is a "presumption against finding
preemption of state law in areas traditionally regulated by the
States." California v. ARCAmeriea Corp, 490 U.S. 93, 101
(1989). "As is always the case in our preemption
jurisprudence," where "federal law is said to bar state action in
fields of traditional state regulation ... we have worked on the
'assumption that the historic police powers of the States were
not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'" CaliforniaDiv. of
Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr.,N.A., Inc.,
519 U.S. 316, 325 (1997), quoting N.Y. State Conf. of Blue
Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travellers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645,
655 (1995). See also Department of Revenue v. ACF Indas.,
Inc., 510 U.S. 332, 345 (1994) ("When detemaining the breadth
- of a federal statute that impinges upon or preempts the States'
traditional powers, we are hesitant to extend the statute beyond
its evident scope"). Accordingly, "where the intent to override
is doubtful, our federal system demands deference to long-
established traditions of state regulation." BEP v. Resolution
Trust Corp., 511 U.S. at 546.
It is not claimed that in enacting IDEA Congress
intended to occupy the field of education of children with
disabilities to the exclusion of the States. Rather, respondents
argue that Delaware's assertion of authority to regulate the
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practice of law by prohibiting those not admitted to practice
from representing parties in due process hearings conflicts
directly with the mandate of Section 141 5(h)(1) according
parents of children with disabilities the right, as respondents see
it, to be represented by respondents as individuals with special
knowledge or training with respect to the problems of children
with disabilities.
It cannot be gainsaid that the regulation of the practice
of law is a traditional State function - existing indeed since the
founding of the Union. Nor can it be doubted that the States
have a substantial interest in the regulation of the practice of
law within their borders. As the United States Supreme Court
noted only months before the Education of All Handicapped
Children Act (now IDEA) was adopted in 1975, "the States
have a compelling interest in the practice of professions within
their boundaries, and ... as part of their power to protect the
public ... they have broad power to establish standards for
licensing practitioners and regulating the practice of
professions.... The interest of the States in regulating lawyers is
especially great since lawyers are essential to the primary
governmental _nction of administering justice, and have
historically been 'officers of the courts."' Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792, reg'h denied, 423 U_S. 886
(1975). This compelling state interest has been recognized
specifically in the IDEA context:
The requirement of representation by counsel is
based upon two cogent policy considerations.
First, there is a strong state interest in regulating
the practice of law. Requiring a minimum level
of competence protects not only the party that is
being represented but also his or her adversaries
and the court from poorly drafted, inarticulate,
or vexatious claims. See Brown v. Ortho
A39
Diagnostic Sys., lnc., 868 F. Supp. 168, 172
(E.D.Va. 1 994) (noting that "the conduct of
litigation by a nonlawyer creates unusual
burdens not only for the part), he represents, but
also for his adversaries and the court") .... Not
only is a licensed attorney likely to be more
skilled in the pracflce of law, but he or she is
also subject to ethical responsibilities and
•obligations that a lay person is not. In addition,
attorneys may be sued for malpractice. See id.
Collinsgru, 161 F.3d at 231; see also Arons, 842 F.2d at 63.
Accordingly, in interpreting IDEA, we may find preemption of
this area of "traditional regulation" or "historic police power"
of the States only if we can conclude that preemption was the
"manifest intent" of Congress.
For the reasons we have outlined above we cannot so
conclude. First, we do not interpret the language of Section
1415(h)(1) as granting any clear right to lay representation.
Thus we see no actual conflict between the state and federal
schemes. Sperry v. Florida ex reL Florida Bar, relied upon by
respondents, likewise does not establish preemption on these
facts. See Arons, 842 F.2d at 61-62 (analyzing Sperry and
rejecting a similar, if not the identical, claim). It would, indeed,
be contra~y to the established precepts cited above for us to
interpret Section 14150(1) so expansively as to extend it
beyond its evident scope into an area of traditional state
regulation when we see no manifest intent of Congress that it
be so extended. It is more reasonable to harmonize the state and
federal schemes than to set one above the other where such is
not necessary to the federal purpose. Wylain, lnc. v. TRE
Corp., 412 A.2d at 346.
We recognize the force of respondent's cOntention that
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representation of families of children with disabilities by
laypersons such as themselves could serve the accomplishment
of the full objectives of Congress under IDEA. At least insofar
as this record reflects the parties in question were unable to find
attorneys who would agree to represent them on a standard fee-
for-service basis, a low-cost basis or pro bono. But the mandate
of Congress under Section 1415 is not that the parents of
children withdisabilities who disagree with an IEP receive free
or low-cost representation. The Congressional mandate is that
they "shall have an opportunity for an impartial due process
hearing" We cannot conclude on the evidence before us that
under the procedures adopted by the State that opportunity is
lacking. The absence of a universe of low cost or pro bono
attorneys willing to take on these cases -- which, notably,
Congress sought to remedy by amending IDEA to allow an
award of attorneys fees to prevailing parents while pointedly
not amending Section 1415(h)(1) to clarify the claimed right to
lay representation -- does not in itself demonstrate that the
purpose and objectives of Congress are impeded by the
traditional prohibition of legal representation of parties by
persons untrained in the law. t°
In so concluding we make no qualitative judgment
concerning the efficacy of the services and advocacy
respondents themselves have provided. It is no part of our task
to reach such a judgment. By all accounts respondents are
_°Respondents fear that the prohibition against the
practice of law by respondents will result in intractable due
process concerns. The cases cited by respondents do not,
however, lead us to conclude that there is a generalized due
process right to representation by lay advocates in the context
of IDEA due process hearings.
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vigorous and knowledgeable advocates in the educational field
in which they are active. Other lay advisors presen t or future
may not be as knowledgeable, vigorous or able.
Nor is our task to determine whether lay representation
in these circumstances should be permitted, or to fix the
conditions and qualifications which might be placed upon any
such lay representation. In this area as in many others there are
those for whom it will be difficult to find free or affordable
legal representation. Many other States -- perhaps all except
Delaware -- have decided to allow nonlawyer representation
and have presumably settled upon schemes of regulation and
oversight which they have concluded are sufficient in their
local circumstances. Respondents and ODC agree that this is an
issue that should be addressed, but it must be addressed to the
proper body with rule-making authority and is not proper to our
adjudicatory function.
***
Our task is to determine whether what respondents did
as revealed on this record constituted the practice of law, and
if so whether or not it was the anthoi'ized practice of law. We
find that in representing the families of Nicholas DeCrease,
Kevin Coale, Matthew Hayes, Shawn White and Philip Russ in
due process hearings conducted by the Delaware Department of
Public Instruction, engaged in the practice of law, that such
practice of law was unauthorized inasmuch as respondents are
not admitted to practice in Delaware, and that such practice of
law was not otherwise authorized under IDEA or any other
pertinent statute or regulation. Accordingly, we recommend
that the Court enter its Order:
1. Declaring that Marilyn Arons, Ruth Watson and
Parent Information Center of New Jersey, Inc., in representing
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the parents of Nicholas DeCrease, Kevin Coale, Matthew
Hayes, Shawn White and Philip Russ in due process hearings
conducted by the Delaware Department of Public Instruction
respondents engaged in the unauthorized practice of law; and
2. Directing Marilyn Arons, Ruth Watson and Parent
Information Center of New Jersey, Inc. to cease and desist
immediately from the unauthorized practice of law in the State
of Delaware.
Rule 16 of the Board provides that "[u]nless otherwise
ordered by the Supreme Court or the Board, costs ... shall be
assessed against the respondent in any case where the Court
determines that the respondent has engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law." In so providing, Rule 16 calls for an exercise
of discretion regarding the award of costs. We believe this is an
appropriate case, in the exercise of that discretion, not to award
costs against respondents. Respondents raised legitimate issues
of significant public interest and presented a good faith defense
in a highly professional manner. Accordingly, we recommend
that the Order entered by the Court provide further:
3. Each party shall bear her or its own costs.
FOR THE BOARD:
Samuel A. Nolen
Hearing Panel Chair
Dated: September 24, 1999
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BOARD ON THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF
DELAWARE
In the Matter of: Marilyn Arons, Ruth Watson, and Parent
Information Center of New Jersey, Inc.
No. UPL-4, 1996
UPL File Nos. 94-12; 95-17
STIPULATION
The Office of the Disciplinary Counsel ("petitioner")
and Marilyn Arons, Ruth Watson, and the Parent Information
Center of New Jersey, Inc. ("respondents"), through their
undersigned counsel, hereby stipulate and agree that if an
evidentiary heating were to be held in this matter, the facts
adduced would be as follows:
The Petition
1. This proceeding was initiated by a Petition filed by
the Office of Disciplinary Counsel on August 8, 1996. An
answer to the Petition, on behalf of all of the respondents, was
timely filed on September 13, 1996. Copies of the Petition and
Answer are appended hereto.
2. The Petition does not allege that the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel has ever received a complaint by any
parent regarding the conduct of respondents, and no such
complaint has ever been received. Indeed, the only complaints
petitioner has received regarding the efforts of respondents
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have been made by school boards and their lawyers, who are
the adversaries of these parents in the due process hearings and
who have lost cases to respondents.
Nature of the Due Process Hearings
3. The gravamen of the Petition is that the respondents
violated Delaware's rules against the unauthorized practice of
law by assisting parents of. disabled children in due process
hearings held by the Department of Public Instruction of the
State of Delaware.
4. The due process hearings arise under the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), a federal statute that
was enacted because Congress recognized that "more than half
of the children with disabilities in the United States do not
receive appropriate educational services." 20 U.S.C.
1400(b)(3). IDEA was enacted with the purpose of"assur[ing]
that all children with disabilities have available to them.., a
t free appropriate public education which emphasizes special
education and related services designed to meet their unique
needs" and "that the rights of children with disabilities and their
parents or guardians are protected." 20 U.S.C. 1400(c).
Accordingly, Congress devised a system of funding special
education and evaluative procedures, 20 U.S.C. 1411, and
required states and localities that accept funding to create and
utilize an elaborate plan for providing Special education that
identifies children who need special educational assistance and
determines what assistance each child needs. 20 U.S.C. 1412-
1414.
5. The State of Delaware participates in IDEA and
receives federal funds under IDEA. Accordingly, the due
process hearings that are the subject of this proceeding must be
conducted in accordance with the dictates of IDEA, see 20
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U.S.C. 1413, 1415(a), as well as Delaware law.
6. As noted, the heart ofihe IDEA is the "assur[ance]
that handicapped children and their parents or guardians are
guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the provision
of free appropriate public education .... "20 U.S.C. 1415(a).
States and localities must allow "the parents or guardians of a
child with disability to examine all relevant records with
respect to... the child and the provision of a free appropriate
public education to such child." 20 U.S.C. 1415(b)(1)(A).
"[W]ritten prior notice [must be given] to the parents or
guardian of the child" whenever schools either propose to
change or initiate, or to refuse to change or initiate, the
identification, evaluation, placement, or provision of special
educational services for the child (commonly referred to as the
"IEP"). 20 U.S.C. 1415(b)(1)(C). This notice must be fitly
informative to "the parents or guardian," who must have the
"opportunity to present complaints with respect to any matter"
relating to the IEP. 20 U.S.C. 1415(b)(1)(D) & (E)..When
complaints are received, "the parents or guardian shall have an
opportunity for an impartial due process heating," 20 U.S.C.
1415(b)(2), and for an impartial review on appeal to a state
educational agency. 20 U.S.C. 1415(c).
7. "Any party to any [due process] hearing conducted
pursuant to subsections (b) and (c) shall be accorded the tight,"
among other things, "to be accompanied and advised by
counsel and by individuals with special knowledge or training
with respect to the problems of children with disabilities," to
present evidence and examine witnesses, to obtain a transcript
of the hearing, and to obtain written findings of fact and
decisions. 20 U.S.C. 1415(d).
8. Consistent with its obligations under IDEA, the
Delaware Department of Public Instruction provides due
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process hearings for parents who believe that their local school
districts have failed to fulfill their duties under IDEA. These
are formal adjudicatory hearings that are held before a three-
member panel appointed by the Department of Public
Instruction. Parents play no role in the selection of panel
members. The panels consist of an attorney (who is always the
chairperson), an educator (generally a professor of special
education or related field at a Delaware college or university),
and a lay person. Lay committee members are selected from a
list of individuals who have passed a training course sponsored
by the Department of Public Instruction. Every panel therefore
consists of two nonlawyers and one lawyer.
9. The due process hearings are governed both by
federal law (which is set forth above) and Delaware law, which
provides that "[a]ny party to a hearing has the right to be
accompanied and advised by counsel or by individuals with
special knowledge or training with respect to the students with
disabilities." Delaware Administrative Manual, at 85.
10. Due process hearings are conducted in a manner
typical of contested, adversarial adjudicatory hearings.
11. The parties consist of parents, who, as explained
more fully below, are not represented by attorneys; the local
school board, which is always represented by counsel; and the
Department of Public Instruction because the State ultimately
bears a portion of the cost of providing a disabled child an
appropriate education tailored to suit the child's unique needs.
Accordingly, the State is separately represented at these
hearings by a lawyer from the Office of Attorney General.
Thus, due process hearings always involve at least two
instrumentalities of government represented by counsel,
arrayed against the parents.
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12. Due process hearings are chaired by the attorney
member of the panel, who is charged with writing the panel's
decision. Although the rules of evidence do not strictly apply,
the Chair makes rulings on matters such as (I) objections (e.g.,
ielevance, materiality, and admissibility); (ii) issues of law
(e.g., burden of proof); and (iii) qualifications of experts. In
advance of the hearing, exhibits must be marked and the parties
must exchange witness lists and all documents to be offered.
13. Due process hearings begin with opening
statements fi'om each party. Because the school board bears the
burden of going forward, it presents its case first. Evidence is
presented through witnesses, who are subjected to direct and
cross-examination. After the school boardrests, the
Department of Public Instruction is afforded an opportunity to
present its case. The parents put their case on last, although
there is then an opportunity for rebuttal testimony. Following
the presentation of evidence, the parties give closing statements
to the panel and may be asked to file written submissions on
• key questions. On average, hearings last from between two and
four days.
14. Although due process hearings have the trappings
of formal adjudications, the issues presented for resolution
typically involve complex factual questions relating to the
unique learning needs of the disabled child: As a result, the
parties' representatives must be familiar with, and able to
understand, the clinical aspects of the child's condition -- skills
and training which lawyers ordinarily lack. The testimony at
these hearings generally focuses on the adequacy and accuracy
of the school board's testing, evaluation, and diagnosis of the
child's problem, and the remedial measures needed to address
the child's disability. The fact witnesses who appear at these
hearings are typically school officials (teachers, guidance
counselors, and principals), and the expert witnesses are
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generally neurologists, psychiatrists, psychologists, physicians,
and others withexpertise in educational and developmental
sciences. Thus, nonlawyers with "special knowledge and
training with respect to the problems of children with
disabilities," like Ms. Arons and Ms. Watson, are fully capable
of presenting the parents' case to the panel. 20 U.S.C. 1415(d).
Parent Information Center of New Jersey_ Inc.
15. The Parent Information Center of New Jersey
("PIC") is a non-profit organization that was founded in 1977
by respondent Marilyn Arons, a public school teacher and
curriculum specialist, who has completed all of her course work
for a Ph.D. in Neuroscience and Education from Teachers
•College; Columbia University, in New York. PIC provides
advice, counseling, and, at times, advocacy services to families
who have children with disabilities. PIC's work is performed
almost entirely through its staff of unpaid volunteers and
operates out of the homes of its family/volunteer members.
PIC receives no government or corporate funding, and its shoe-
string budget consists of contributions and membership dues
from individuals. Annual membership dues are set on a sliding
scale according to ability to pay. Those who can afford it pay
$100, and those of more modest means can pay as little as a
quarter. Although PIC began in New Jersey, it now does
extensive work in New York State, and it has branched out as
well to other states, including Pennsylvania and Delaware.
Over the past twenty years, PIC has assisted parents on over
20,000 occasions, ranging from crisis intervention, counseling,
and assistance in negotiating IEPs with local school boards to
handling due process hearings. Parents hear of PIC through
word of mouth and are referred to PIC by psychiatrists,
psychologists, neurologists, social welfare organizations, school
officials, child protective agencies, law school clinics, and other
social service agencies. There is no other organization in the
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nation that provides services to parents of children with
disabilities similar to those offered by PIC.
16. PIC has handled approximately 500 due process
hearings on behalf of parents with children with disabilities.
Although the bulk of these hearings have been conducted in
New Jersey and New York, a handful have been held in
Pennsylvania and Delaware•
17. No state, apart from Delaware, has ever charged
respondents -- or anyone affiliated with PIC -- with violating
proscriptions against the unauthorized practice of law.
Due Process Hearings In Delaware in Which Respondents Have
18. The Petition alleges that Ms. Arons providedlegal
advocacy to parents involved in no fewer than four due process
hearings conducted by the Delaware Department of Public
Instruction; namely, those involving the children identified as
Nicholas DeCrease, Kevin Coale, Matthew Hayes, and Shawn
White. The Petition further alleges that Ms. Watson provided
legal advocacy services in at least one due process hearing,
which involved a child identified as Philip Russ, conducted by
the Delaware Department of Public Instruction.
19. Respondents did, in fact, accompany and advise the
parents of each of the children identified in paragraph 18 in the
due process hearings and, on behalf of those parents, made
statements, examined and cross-examined witnesses, raised
objections, proffered records and exhibits, and submitted briefs
and other documents to the panel.
20. None of the parents of the children identified in
paragraph 18 can afford the services of a private attorney.
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21. The parents of the children identified in paragraph
18 diligently looked to find legal counsel to represent them in
the due process hearing. None could find an attorney willing
to represent them on a standard fee-for-service basis, and none
could find an attorney willing to represent them on some
reduced-cost or pro bono basis.
22. No legal services or other organization that
provides free or low-cost legal services to people of low or
modest means provides assistance in due process hearings in
Delaware.
23. There is no source offimding, through fee-shifting
statutes or otherwise, for lawyers to assist parents in due
process hearings in Delaware.
24. Although there are child protection and advocacy
services in Delaware, no organization providing such services
gives assistance to parents in special education cases or due
process hearings.
25. The economic reality is that parents of children
with disabilities who are affluent or reasonably well-off
financially enroll their children at private schools and thus do
not depend on public school authorities to prrovide their
children with an appropriate education. It is only parents who
are unable to afford private education for their disabled children
who are likely to end up in due process hearings in Delaware.
26. The parents of the children identified in paragraph
18 would not have exercised their right to a due process
hearings under federal and Delaware law but for the availability
and assistance of respondents.
27.: None of the parents of the children identified in
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paragraph 18 would have participated in a due process hearing
without respondents' assistance because they were intimidated
by the formality and complexity of the due process hearing.
With the exception of Mr. and Ms. Hayes, none of the parents
are college graduates, none had legal training of any sort, none
were familiar with the procedures used in due process hearings
conducted by the Department of Public Instruction or in legal
proceedings generally, and none had the grounding in the
technical issues that lay at the core of their disputes with the
local schools boards to enable them to handle the hearings pro
Se.
28. None of the parents of the children identified in
paragraph 18 would have participated in adue process hearing
without respondents' assistance because they were also
intimidated by the fact that the hearing was convened by the
Department of Public Instruction (which is also an adverse
party to the proceeding) and placed them in an adversarial
posture against two instrumentalities of government, each
represented by lawyers.
29. The parents of the children identified in paragraph
18 understood that respondents are not lawyers, do not hold
themselves out as lawyers, and are not members of the
Delaware bar or any other bar. Respondents disclosed those
facts to them at the outset.
30. The parents of the children identified in paragraph
18 each sought out the services of respondents.
31. None of the parents of the children identified in
paragraph 18 were charged a fee of any sort by respondents.
Although the PIC generally requires all of the parents to whom
it provides assistance to become a member of PIC, the parents
of the children identified in paragraph 18 are of modest means.
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Respondents have never sought payment to represent parents in
due process hearings and did not seek payment from the parents
of the children identified in paragraph 18. Respondents did not
receive a penny from the parents of Kevin Coale or Matthew
Hayes, and received only nominal amounts from the parents of
Nicholas DeCrease and Phillip Russ to def_y travel and other
expenses. Nicholas DeCrease's parents paid $1,000 for
expenses, which did not begin to cover the actual cost to PIC,
which included extensive travel and other costs. Phillip Russ'
parents contributed $300, which also did not cover PIC's
actual, out-of-pocket expenses. These payments were made
voluntarily by the parents, and not as a condition for the work
respondents performed on their behalf.
32. The parents of the children identified in paragraph
18 are extraordinarily grateful for the services rendered to them
and their families by respondents and believe that their position
was effectively presented in the due process hearings.
33. In fact, the results respondents achieved for the
children identified in paragraph 18 confirm the effectiveness of
the presentation made on their behalf. In each case, the parents
and child won significant relief, either at the due process
hearing itself, or on judicial review, which is based on the
record created at the due process hearing.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel
/s/
David Curtis Glebe, Esq.
Chief Counsel
300 West Ninth Street
Suite 300-A
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P.O. Box 472
Wilmington, Delaware 19899
(302) 577-7042
Petitioner
Dated: August 6, 1998
Ls/
Walter S. Rowland, Esq.
2501 Willard Street
Wilmington, Delaware 19806-1237
(302) 654-6526
I.D. No. 511
Attorney for Respondents
Of Counsel:
David C. Vladeck, Esq.
Public Citizen Litigation Group
1600 20th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20009-1001
(202) 588-1000
Dated: August 4, 1998
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BOARD ON THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF
DELAWARE
In the Matter of:
MARILYN ARONS, RUTH WATSON, and PARENT
INFORMATION CENTER OF NEW JERSEY, INC.
Respondents.
_F_ID_F2__TiAL
No. UPL-4,1996
(UPL File Nos. 94-12; 95-17) OF
AMENDMENTS TO STIPULATION
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel ("Petitioner") and
Marilyn Arons, Ruth Watson, and the Parent Information
Center of New Jersey, Inc. ("Respondents"), through their
undersigned counsel, hereby stipulate and agree to the
following amendments to the Stipulation entered into by the
Petitioner and the Respondents and filed with the Board on the
Unauthorized Practice of Law on August 6, 1998. Where the
language of the Stipulation as been altered, any new or
additional language is underlined; deleted language is in
brackets.
1. The first sentence of paragraph I1 of the
Stipulation is amended to read as follows: "In cases involving
private placements, like the cases that gave rise to this
proceeding, the parties consist of parents, who, as explained
more fully below, are often not represented by attorneys; the
local school board, which is always represented by counsel; and
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the Department of Public Instruction because the State
ultimately bears a portion of the cost of providing a disabled
child an appropriate education tailored to suit the child's unique
needs."
2. The last sentence of paragraph 11 of the
Stipulation is amended to read as follows: "Thus, due process
hearings concerning private placements [always] involve two
instrumentalities of government represented by counsel,
arrayed against the parents."
3. The last sentence of paragraph 14 of the
Stipulation is amended to read as follows: "Ms. Arons and Ms.
Watson are nonlawyers with "special knowledge and training
with respect to the problems of children with disabilities.'"
[Thus, nonlawyers with 'special knowledge and training with
respect to the problems of children with disabilities,' like Ms.
Arons and Ms. Watson, are fully capable of presenting the
parents' case to the panel. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d).].
4. Paragraph 22 of the Stipulation is amended to read
as follows: "'Insofar as the parties are aware, the only legal
services organization that has provided legal representation by
counsel at Delaware IDEA due process hearings is Delaware's
Community Legal Aid Society, Inc., which has, on occasion,
provided representation at IDEA due process hearings to
parents and children whose cases satisfy the organization's
case acceptance criteria." [No legal services or Other
organization that provides free or low-cost legal services to
people of low or modest means provides assistance in due
process hearings in Delaware.].
5. Paragraph 23 of the Stipulation is deleted in its
entirety. [There is no source of funding, through fee-shifting
statutes or otherwise, for lawyers to assist parents in due
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process hearings in Delaware.].
6. Paragraph 33 is amended to read as follows: "The
parents and children identified inparagraph 18 obtained some
form of relief, at the due process hearing itself, on judicial
review (which is based upon the record created at the due
process hearing), or through negotiation or settlement." [In
fact, the results respondents achieved for the children identified
in paragraph 18 confirm the effectiveness of the presentation
made on their behalf. In each case, the parents and child won
significant relief, either at the due process hearing itself, or on
judicial review, which is based on the record created at the due
process hearing.].
OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL
Is/
Mary M. Johnston
Chief Counsel
Michael S. McGinniss
Disciplinary Counsel
200 West Ninth Street, #300-A
Wilmington, DE 19801
(302) 577-7042
Petitioner
Dated! June 23, 1999
/s/
Walter S. Rowland, Esquire
2501 Willard Street
Wilmington, DE 19806-1237
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I.D. No. 511
Attorneys for Respondents
Dated: June 23, 1999
Of Counsel:
David C. Vladeck, Esquire
Public Citizen Litigation Group
1600 20th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20009-1001
(202) 588-1000
